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Prior to the introduction of section 37C into the Pension Funds Act. 24 of 1956, the benefit 
payable as a result of the death of a member would devolve in accordance with his last will and 
testament or the provisions of intestate succession. The advent of section 37C brought a 
statutory regime which expressly excludes freedom of testation and rather looks to the board of 
a fund to distribute the death benefit. The board may only pay the dependants of a deceased 
(either factual or legal) or the persons he has recorded on his nomination form. The section 
relies on the board to exercise its discretion in a manner which results in an equitable 
distribution of the death benefit notwithstanding that it does not provide any guidelines as to how 
this is to be achieved. Accordingly, numerous decisions are challenged by the identified 
beneficiaries because they are unhappy with the manner in which the board exercised its 
discretion. This results in complaints being lodged with the Pension Funds Adjudicator. Many 
such complaints should never have arisen or could have been easily solved by a proper 
exercise of discretion on the part of the board. The problem is that these complaints are adding 
to an already burdened office. Adequate training and understanding of the obligations of section 
37C would probably result in fewer complaints to the Adjudicator. This dissertation examines 
whether the determinations which have been issued by the Adjudicator in respect of section 
37C indicate a need for such training and understanding and, if they do, what possible remedies 
there might be to cure such a problem. Recommendations arising from this are that trustees 
must receive training focused on section 37C and proposed practical protocols to assist a board 
when exercising its duty to make an equitable distribution.  
 
KEY TERMS: death benefits; pension funds; section 37C; equitable distribution; dependants 
and nominees; board of trustees; training; adjudicator determinations; discretion; standard 
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My interest in pension law only began when I started my articles of clerkship in January 2006 at  
a law firm which has a specialist employee benefits practice. In the intervening years between 
being a candidate attorney and writing this dissertation I have practiced in the employee 
benefits department providing advice to boards of trustees of pension funds, participating 
employers in such funds and individual members or the beneficiaries of such members.  
 
What struck me when I began to work in this field was that I knew many people who were 
members of funds or who had retired from such funds but I had never once heard anyone speak 
about their freedom of testation being limited by section 37C. I wondered if this was because 
they did not think it important or because they were unaware of it. I tested my new found 
knowledge out on friends and family and was shocked to find that none of them knew that the 
benefit payable on their death would not necessarily be distributed in accordance with the 
nomination form that they had completed. 
 
I have since trained a number of boards and am amazed that even with the funds of major JSE 
listed entities and within the employer appointed trustees that there is often at least one trustee 
who is shocked to learn about the consequences of section 37C. What follows is usually a 
fifteen minute question session aimed at figuring out how to circumvent the operation of section 
37C. 
 
From my exposure to boards and given that the impact of section 37C is far reaching and has 
consequences for every member of a fund, I began to appreciate that there was still more to be 
done on ensuring that death benefit distributions are made in terms of the Act. I also began to 
appreciate that if Boards could get a distribution “right” there was less chance that a complaint 
would be lodged, which would in turn have an impact on the capacity within the Adjudicator’s 
office to make determinations. This dissertation is my attempt at making some of the knowledge 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
1.1.1 In relation to the size of the economy, South Africa has one of the largest 
pension fund industries in the world, with 9 million members and assets in 
excess of R2 trillion. Pension funds pool funds from both employers and 
employees, with the aim of providing retirees and their beneficiaries with 
income upon the retirement, death or disability of a member. This guards 
against poverty in old age and reduces the potential dependency on the 
government. 1 
 
1.1.2 In line with government’s policy objectives to reduce potential 
dependency on itself, the Pension Funds Act (hereinafter referred to as 
the Act) expressly makes provision for the consideration of financial and 
legal dependency in the event of the death of a member of a pension fund 
arrangement. The intention being that the correct distribution of a death 
benefit will result in a lower risk that persons will have to have recourse to 
the State for monetary social grants. 
 
1.1.3 Section 37C regulates the payment of benefits upon the death of a 
member of a pension fund, which fund is subject to the provisions of the 
Act.  Section 37C reads as follows: 
 
“37C. Disposition of pension benefits upon death of member.— 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in 
the rules of a registered fund, any benefit (other than a benefit 
payable as a pension to the spouse or child of the member in 
terms of the rules of a registered fund, which must be dealt with in 
                                                          
1 National Treasury “A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better”2011 at page 49. 
National Treasury Policy Document: www.treasury.gov.za, last visited 30 September 2011.  
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terms of such rules) payable by such a fund upon the death of a 
member, shall, subject to a pledge in accordance with section 
19(5)(b)(i) and subject to the provisions of sections 37A(3) and 
37D, not form part of the assets in the estate of such a member, 
but shall be dealt with in the following manner: 
(a) If the fund within twelve months of the death of the 
member becomes aware of or traces a dependant or 
dependants of the member, the benefit shall be paid to 
such dependant or, as may be deemed equitable by the 
board, to one of such dependants or in proportions to 
some of or all such dependants. 
(b) If the fund does not become aware of or cannot trace any 
dependant of the member within 12 months of the death of 
the member, and the member has designated in writing to 
the fund a nominee who is not a dependant of the 
member, to receive the benefit or such portion of the 
benefit as is specified by the member in writing to the fund, 
the benefit or such portion of the benefit shall be paid to 
such nominee: Provided that where the aggregate amount 
of the debts in the estate of the member exceeds the 
aggregate amount of the assets in his estate, so much of 
the benefit as is equal to the difference between such 
aggregate amount of debts and such aggregate amount of 
assets shall be paid into the estate and the balance of 
such benefit or the balance of such portion of the benefit 
as specified by the member in writing to the fund shall be 
paid to the nominee. 
(bA) If a member has a dependant and the member has also 
designated in writing to the fund a nominee to receive the 
benefit or such portion of the benefit as is specified by the 
member in writing to the fund, the fund shall within twelve 
months of the death of such member pay the benefit or 
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such portion thereof to such dependant or nominee in such 
proportions as the board may deem equitable: Provided 
that this paragraph shall only apply to the designation of a 
nominee made on or after 30 June 1989: Provided further 
that, in respect of a designation made on or after the said 
date, this paragraph shall not prohibit a fund from paying 
the benefit, either to a dependant or nominee 
contemplated in this paragraph or, if there is more than 
one such dependant or nominee, in proportions to any or 
all of those dependants and nominees. 
(c) If the fund does not become aware of or cannot trace any 
dependant of the member within twelve months of the 
death of the member and if the member has not 
designated a nominee or if the member has designated a 
nominee to receive a portion of the benefit in writing to the 
fund, the benefit or the remaining portion of the benefit 
after payment to the designated nominee, shall be paid 
into the estate of the member or, if no inventory in respect 
of the member has been received by the Master of the 
Supreme Court in terms of section 9 of the Estates Act, 
1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965), into the Guardian’s Fund. 
(2)(a) For the purposes of this section, a payment by a registered fund 
for the benefit of a dependant or nominee contemplated in this 
section shall be deemed to be a payment to such dependant or 
nominee, if payment is made to— 
(i) a trustee contemplated in the Trust Property Control Act, 
1988, nominated by— 
(aa) the member; 
(bb) a major dependant or nominee, subject to 
subparagraph (cc); or 
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(cc) a person recognised in law or appointed by a Court 
as the person responsible for managing the affairs 
or meeting the daily care needs of a minor 
dependant or nominee, or a major dependant or 
nominee not able to manage his or her affairs or 
meet his or her daily care needs; 
(ii) a person recognised in law or appointed by a Court as the 
person responsible for managing the affairs or meeting the 
daily care needs of a dependant or nominee; or 
(iii) a beneficiary fund. 
(b) No payments may be made in terms of this section on or after 1 
January 2009 to a beneficiary fund which is not registered under 
this Act. 
(3) Any benefit dealt with in terms of this section, payable to a minor 
dependant or minor nominee, may be paid in more than one 
payment in such amounts as the board may from time to time 
consider appropriate and in the best interests of such dependant 
or nominee: Provided that interest at a reasonable rate, having 
regard to the fund return earned by the fund, shall be added to the 
outstanding balance at such times as the board may determine: 
Provided further that any balance owing to such a dependant or 
nominee at the date on which he or she attains majority or dies, 
whichever occurs first, shall be paid in full. 
(4)(a) Any benefit dealt with in terms of this section, payable to a major 
dependant or major nominee, may be paid in more than one 
payment if the dependant or nominee has consented thereto in 
writing: Provided that— 
(i) the amount of the payments, intervals of payment, interest 
to be added and other terms and conditions are disclosed 
in a written agreement; and 
5 
 
(ii) the agreement may be cancelled by either party on written 
notice not exceeding 90 days. 
(b) If the agreement contemplated in paragraph (a) is cancelled the 
balance of the benefit shall be paid to the dependant or nominee 
in full. 
 
(5) The provisions of subsections (3) and (4) do not apply to a 
beneficiary fund, and any remaining assets held for the benefit of 
a deceased beneficiary in a beneficiary fund must be paid into the 
estate of such beneficiary or, if no inventory in respect of the 
beneficiary has been received by the Master of the High Court in 
terms of section 9 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 
No. 66 of 1965), into the Guardian’s Fund.” 
 
1.1.4 Notwithstanding the express wording of section 37C, in recent years there 
has been a marked increase in the number of cases referred to the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator (hereinafter referred to as the Adjudicator) for 
determination, which have emanated from the application of section 37C, 
a section which was intended by the Legislature to streamline the 
distribution of death benefits and alleviate the potential burden on the 
State. In light of the increased referrals, the question which begs to be 
answered is whether poor drafting has resulted in section 37C becoming 
a minefield of potential mistakes or whether the very people responsible 
for giving effect to section 37C are failing in their responsibilities.  
 
1.1.5 Section 37C regulates the distribution of death benefits to the identified 
dependants or nominees of a deceased pension fund member. The 
foundation of the section is that the death benefit does not form part of a 
deceased member’s estate but is rather required to be distributed in 
accordance with a legislated scheme which gives preference to factual 
need and dependency above a member’s freedom to dictate the manner 




1.2 Problem  
 
1.2.1 It is evident from the wording of section 37C that it imposes an onerous 
duty on the Board which requires the Board to determine dependency 
and to effect an equitable distribution among a deceased member’s 
dependants and nominees, notwithstanding the fact that in most 
instances the Board has no prior knowledge of the parties concerned or 
the relationship which they shared with the deceased member, and then 
to effect payment in a reasonable manner in accordance with the options 
provided in the section. Accordingly, section 37C requires direct input 
from the Board with regard to who qualifies as a dependant and the 
amount which is to be allocated to each beneficiary.  
 
1.2.2 Thus, by its very nature, section 37C requires the Board to make value 
judgments and as such provides great scope for error. It is clear from the 
determinations which are published on the website of the Office of the 
Adjudicator that the matters which arise for determination are usually due 
to the negligence or lack of understanding of the Board as to what section 
37C requires of them and different aspects of duty which are required at 
the different stages of a death benefit distribution.  
 
1.2.3 Section 37C is recognised in the retirement industry as being a section 
which is fraught with potential difficulties and which requires a great deal 
of technical knowledge, which can be extremely prejudicial to both the 
trustees, who are expected to apply it, and to those who are intended to 
benefit from its provisions. The Act itself gives very little indication as to 
how section 37C should operate or be applied.  
 
1.2.4 Prior to the establishment of the office of the Adjudicator, Boards faced 
fewer instances of having their determinations tested before any tribunal. 
The introduction of the Adjudicator’s Office has without doubt placed 
greater scrutiny on the actions of Boards. The Adjudicator's Office gives 
fund members a free dispute resolution mechanism, as opposed to 
the normal litigation procedures in South African courts which are very 
7 
 
expensive.  Due to easy access to the Adjudicator’s Office many funds 
and their Boards are now exposed to complaints and are at a greater 
risk of having their decisions overturned and replaced, causing 
prejudice to the Fund and its members and exposing the trustees to 
risk. 
 
1.2.5 The retirement funding industry is very much a closed industry which is 
reliant upon internal legal advice or legal advice obtained from senior 
legal counsel, accordingly the legal knowledge garnered remains within 
the ambit of a close knit group of individuals, resulting in very little 
information filtering down to the general public or to the Boards of smaller 
pension funds. It is not unusual in the pension fund environment to find 
that a Board is unaware of the full extent of their obligations unless they 
have specifically requested a legal opinion which considers such duties. 
The retirement fund industry is one which, like any other business is 
driven by profit, accordingly the legal opinions which are received often 
take into account the detrimental effect on the business of a fund or the 
impact on the ability to administer the fund or the actual practice in the 
industry, in order to substantiate any deviance between a practice and 
compliance, rather than providing a strict legal interpretation of the 
manner in which section 37C should be applied. Accordingly, irregular 
practice, even among the very large pension funds and the large 
administrators, tasked to provide administration services to pension 
funds, continues to abound, as the answers to complex legal questions 
around section 37C remain simply legal opinions which are hardly ever 
tested in a court. Further, those decisions, in respect of section 37C, 
which have been given by the Adjudicator, lack precedential value and 
are hardly ever tested in a court, or where an appeal is noted in 
accordance with section 30P of the Act, the outcome is rarely ever 
reported. Accordingly, very little industry change emanates as a result of 
the Adjudicator’s determinations and interpretation of the various aspects 
of section 37C, although some funds use the determinations as guiding 




1.2.6 In light of there being no compulsory guidance for Boards on the manner 
in which section 37C should be applied and the anomalies and 
uncertainties which have, over time, attached to the application of section 
37C, trustees have no clear understanding of what their role is when 
making a distribution or whether a distribution complies, in all respects, 
with section 37C. Given the potential prejudice which Boards, and 
individual trustees, can face if a distribution is incorrect it would be 
reasonable and logical to expect that they would be better equipped to 
ensure that the margin for making errors when effecting such distributions 
is very limited, however it appears that no such “equipping” is evident 
within the retirement funding industry.  
 
1.2.7 Boards are provided with training but often such training only occurs 
rarely or the content is designed to be a crash course which covers the 
entire Act rather than focussing on specific aspects and like any form of 
training, people cannot ask relevant questions if they are not aware of the 
very essence of their obligations. The limited training provided to trustees 
is not sufficient and does not appear to equip a trustee to handle the 
diverse section 37C scenarios which are placed before him or her on a 
regular basis. It appears that what trustees require is a basic guideline on 
how a simple distribution should be made. Such a guideline should at the 
very least better equip trustees to handle more complex distributions.  
 
1.2.8 An erroneous application of section 37C can lead to the distribution of a 
death benefit being incorrect, resulting in prejudice to beneficiaries (where 
they receive less than they should have received but for the incorrect 
distribution or are not considered at all in the distribution), the unjust 
enrichment of a beneficiary (where a beneficiary receives more than is 
equitable) and/or loss to the pension fund concerned (where the fund has 
incorrectly paid out to a beneficiary and is still required to make the 
corrected distribution but is unable to recover the overpayment). 
Ultimately the incorrect application of section 37C will be prejudicial to the 
entire membership of a fund as it may result in the fund bearing legal 
costs and/or having to make a further payment over and above what has 
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already been incorrectly paid out. Such instances are evident in the 
Adjudicator’s decisions. Even our courts have made decisions which are 
detrimental to the fund concerned. In the unreported judgment in the case 
of Botha v Cape Gate Management Provident Fund and Others2 the court 
set aside the decision of the Adjudicator which agreed with the Board’s 
distribution of the benefit and ordered that the full death benefit payable 
be paid to the applicant. The fund in that matter was also ordered to pay 
the costs of the application. The fund then sought a declarator in which it 
argued that Ms Botha (the applicant) was required to seek payment of the 
amount from the beneficiary who had been paid by virtue of the incorrect 
distribution, that is, Ms Botha should institute enrichment proceedings to 
recover what should have been paid to her by the fund. The court3 in the 
declaratory application held that the judgment handed down in the initial 
case gave rise to a judgment debt against the fund in favour of Ms Botha. 
Accordingly, the Cape Gate Management Provident Fund and its 
members were prejudiced by the incorrect distribution made by its Board. 
As at the date of this dissertation the Cape Gate Management Provident 
Fund is still in negotiations to recover the overpayment but has had to 
make payment of the full death benefit to the applicant.  
 
1.2.9 In light of the ever growing trend for judgments and determinations to 
require funds to make the correct distribution notwithstanding that they 
would be out of pocket, and placing the onus on the funds to claw back 
the overpayment from unjustly enriched beneficiaries4, it is imperative that 
Boards ensure that they have sufficient mechanisms in place which 
mitigate the risk of them making a distribution which could be classified by 
a judicial tribunal as being incorrect. Further, there is a need for greater 
understanding of the provisions of section 37C as such an understanding 
is likely to result in fewer referrals to the Adjudicator or fewer successful 
challenges and court decisions which are prejudicial to funds in general, a 
                                                          
2 Botha v Cape Gate Management Provident Fund and Others, South Gauteng High Court 
(Johannesburg), Case No. 08/6618 (unreported). 
3 Cape Gate Management Provident Fund v Botha and Others South Gauteng High Court 
(Johannesburg), Case No. 2010/5463 (unreported). 
4 Supra footnote 2 at paragraph 26. 
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lower risk of prejudice to members and to individual trustees in particular.  
 
1.2.10 Most cases which have come before the Adjudicator for determination 
show a common misunderstanding of the extent of the discretion afforded 
to trustees5, the reasonable efforts which need to be undertaken to 
ensure an equitable distribution and the manner in which death benefits 
may be dealt with. The aim of this dissertation is to attempt to provide 
trustees with an understanding of section 37C, to highlight the problem 
areas which arise within that section, to provide possible legal 
interpretations as to how these problems can be resolved within the 
provisions of the Act and to provide a guideline to Boards on what 
considerations should be applied by them when called upon to make a 
distribution in accordance with section 37C. This dissertation is aimed at 
providing possible solutions to the lack of understanding and knowledge 




1.3.1 The hypotheses on which this dissertation is based are the following: 
 
1.3.1.1 The high number of cases dealing with section 37C indicates that 
a great number of Boards do not have adequate training in 
respect of the provisions of section 37C and the role which they 
are required to play in ensuring compliance with that section. 
Boards should be receiving more training on how this section 
should be interpreted and applied.  
 
1.3.1.2 The practice within the retirement funding industry does not reflect 
the legal position as provided for by the Act. An alignment of the 
practice in the industry and the proper interpretation of section 
37C will result in fewer referrals to the Adjudicator and decrease 
the risk faced by Boards and individual members of the Board.  
 
                                                          
5 Jones v National Technikon Retirement Fund 2002 (2) BPLR 2960 (PFA) at paragraph 15. 
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1.3.1.3 Increased administrative steps which includes a proper recordal of 
the details of individuals who are dependent upon a member or 
whom the member perceives as being dependent upon him or her 
will mitigate the potential prejudice faced by the Board and/or the 
fund and its members.  
 
1.3.1.4 A breakdown and understanding of the duties which attach to 
section 37C will give Boards a greater understanding of what is 
required of them and will enable them to function at their best 




1.4.1 For purposes of this dissertation the following is assumed: 
 
1.4.1.1 The nature of a pension fund is a well understood concept and the 
legal consequences of registration of a fund in terms of the Act are 
accepted and known to the readers of this dissertation.  
 
1.4.1.2 The problems attaching to section 37C are not as a result of 
defects in the section itself but result from the application of the 
section by trustees of pension funds. Accordingly, poor drafting by 
the Legislature will not be considered in this dissertation as a 
potential reason for the incorrect application of section 37C and 
the numerous complaints which arise as a result of its application.  
 
1.4.1.3 The majority of the cases referred to the Adjudicator, which 
related to section 37C, were as a result of trustee negligence or 
lack of understanding of the workings and requirements of section 
37C. 
 
1.4.1.4 Boards have an understanding, at the very least, of which persons 
should be considered for qualification as potential beneficiaries, 
that is, it is assumed that Boards are aware of which persons 
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should be considered as potential beneficiaries. 
 
1.4.1.5 Only the fiduciary duties of a Board as set out in common law and 
the Act are relevant for purposes of a section 37C distribution. 
None of the plethora of financial legislation or any other legislation 
has an impact on a Board’s duty to effect an equitable distribution. 
Accordingly, the impact of such legislation will not be analysed or 
considered in this dissertation. 
 
1.4.1.6 The rules do not contain any additional duties to those contained 
in the Act. 
 
1.5 Conclusion  
 
1.5.1 Section 37C has over the years received severe scrutiny and numerous 
relevant forums (such as the Pension Lawyers Association, the Principal 
Officers Association and the Institute of Retirement Funds) have debated 
its place within South African society and the duties which it places on the 
Board. Section 37C has formed the basis for numerous discussion papers 
and has been the focus of many seminars and conferences.  
 
1.5.2 The paternalistic intention which informed the section and its far reaching 
consequences, in the pension fund context, of limiting a member’s ability 
to determine who should benefit upon his or her death, has received a 
great deal of criticism. The numerous cases which are before the 
Adjudicator each year appear to indicate a clear indication that Boards 
are failing to achieve the purpose of the section, there has been no move 
by the Legislature to effect any amendments to the section. In light of my 
assumption that there is no flaw in the section itself I will not consider the 
merits of the Legislature lack of intervention but will rather take such lack 
of intervention as strengthening the assumption that there is no flaw in the 
section therefore no intervention is required by the Legislature. It would 
appear that the solution which will result in fewer death distribution 
referrals to the Adjudicator is one which must be found within the context 
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of section 37C as it currently reads. Accordingly, the pension funding 
industry needs to consider interventions which will result in fewer referrals 
being sent to the Adjudicator. A decrease in section 37C referrals to the 
Adjudicator will decrease the burden on an already over wrought process, 
which will have a direct positive impact on the industry, as the Adjudicator 
will then have more time at his or her disposal to consider other issues 
plaguing the industry. 
 
1.5.3 The stakeholders within the retirement funding industry can be very useful 
in reducing the risk of a death benefit distribution being taken to a tribunal 
for consideration but such assistance should take the form of ensuring 
that Boards are given as much training as possible on the workings of 
section 37C and their role in ensuring an equitable distribution. Many 
administrators of pension funds and consultants to such funds have over 
the years obtained a greater understanding of the workings of the section 
through the views expressed by the legal fraternity in various opinions, 
such understanding should be passed on to Boards. However, even if no 
other stakeholder in the retirement fund industry sought to implement 
change in the manner in which section 37C is implemented, given that the 
section places a duty on the Board and no other person or entity, a 
prudent Board would formulate processes and protocols which seek to 
reduce the litigation and prejudice which arises in respect of death benefit 
distributions. Accordingly, each Board has to seek to reduce such 
litigation. The starting point of such an end goal is to gain an 
understanding of the duties which the Board needs to satisfy and then 
develop standard operating procedures or protocols which seek to 
achieve such an end result. For purposes of this dissertation I intend to 
provide a Board with an understanding of section 37C and with 
recommendations which are aimed at protecting against death benefit 





CHAPTER 2:  RATIONALE FOR INTRODUCTION OF SECTION 37C 
 




2.1.1 It is evident from the numerous discussion papers, including but not limited to 
the policy paper issued by National Treasury6 that the Legislature regards 
pension assets as a critical and essential component of not just a person's 
rights but also the economy of the country. It has therefore established 
a mandatory scheme in terms of which a death benefit has to be 
distributed.7 
 
2.1.2 Section 37C regulates the payment of death benefits, that is, the section 
only becomes applicable where the rules of the fund in question provide for 
the payment of a lump sum benefit upon the death of a member. Section 
37C, contrary to the practice of a number of funds, does not regulate 
instances where insurers are required to make payment directly to the 
deceased’s nominated beneficiaries. Such scenario occurs where the risk 
policy beneficiary is not a fund. Accordingly, the distribution of group life 
policies, which exist outside of a retirement funding arrangement, are not 
regulated by the provisions of section 37C and must be distributed in 
accordance with the deceased member’s wishes as recorded in the 
insurance nomination form which was completed by the deceased.  
 
2.1.3 Although, one of the assumptions is a basic understanding of the 
provisions of section 37C, I will nevertheless mention that Boards face 
great risk when they allocate the benefits of an insurance policy, which 
exists outside a retirement funding arrangement, in accordance with the 
provisions of section 37C. Such an action could result in the nominated 
beneficiary of the policy seeking financial redress against the Board or the 
fund for prejudice suffered as a result of the Board incorrectly deeming the 
                                                          
6 Op Cit 1 at page 49 
7 Gowing v Lifestyle Retirement Fund and Others PFA/WE/9248/2006/KM at paragraph 7.2. 
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benefit payable in terms of a group life policy to be a death benefit as 
contemplated by the Act.  
 
2.1.4 There have been numerous writings which have considered the different 
nuances of the section8 and it is not necessary to devote much space to a 
reconsideration of what should, if a person occupies a role of a member of 
the Board, at the very least be a minimum understanding of the section. For 
purposes of this dissertation it is only necessary for me to give the reader a 
simple understanding of section 37C which is intended to equip the reader 
to understand the more complex issue of the duties of the Board when 
effecting the distribution required by section 37C.  
 
2.2 Freedom of testation  
 
2.2.1 Section 37C did not form part of the Act when it was enacted in 1956 and 
was only inserted into the Act in 1976. Section 37C was intended to serve 
a social function. It was enacted to protect dependency, even over the 
clear wishes of a deceased member. Section 37C specifically restricts an 
individual’s freedom of testation in order that no dependants are left 
without support. This is intended to indirectly decrease the burden on the 
State to provide for these persons and promotes social protection, which is 
to be implemented by Boards.9 
 
2.2.2 In the case of Mashazi10, Judge Hussain, when dealing with a complaint 
regarding the distribution of a death benefit, stated that section 37C 
                                                          
8 See Marx GL and Hanekom K The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee 
Benefits 2009 ed (Lexis Nexis Durban 2009) and Hunter R et al The Pension Funds Act: A 
commentary on the Act, regulations, selected notices, directives and circulars 2010 ed (Hunter 
Benefits Law Johannesburg 2010). These are the main publications from which a clear 
understanding pension funding can be obtained. There are very few academic writings in this 
specialized area of law. All relevant academic literature has been used and referenced in this 
dissertation. There are a number of commercial articles and an academic writing which have not 
been used as they are not relevant to the topic under discussion. The academic article which I have 
read but which I have not used is: Mtendeweka Owen Mhango “An examination of the accurate 
application of the dependency test under the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956” (2008) 126-135 SA 
Merc LJ. 
9 Per Hussain J in the judgment in Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund 2003 
(1) SA (W) at 632H-J, [2002] 8BPLR 3703(W) at 3705-6. 
10 Ibid at paragraph 6. 
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serves a social function. It was enacted to protect dependency even over 
the clear wishes of the deceased. The learned judge accepted that 
section 37C specifically restricts freedom of testation in order that no 
dependants are left without support and specifically excludes the benefit 
from the assets of the estate of a member.11 
 
2.2.3 The intention which is given effect to by the provisions of section 37C is 
evident in the decision of Dobie NO v National Technikon Retirement 
Pension Fund.12 In Dobie, the deceased member nominated his estate 
as the beneficiary of his death benefit. The Board of the National 
Technikon Retirement Pension Fund duly paid the benefit into the 
deceased member’s estate. A complaint was subsequently lodged with 
the Adjudicator, by the executor of the estate, regarding the payment 
of interest. The determination however contained legal observations 
regarding the application of section 37C which are worth considering. The 
Adjudicator pointed out that: 
 
“the purpose of section 37C is to restrict a deceased member's 
freedom of testation in relation to the benefits payable by the fund 
in the event of death. The guiding principle is that such assets do 
not form part of the deceased's estate and are required to be 
distributed in accordance with the statutory scheme which gives 
preference to need and dependency above the member's choice. 
The section imposes an onerous duty on the board of 
management of a fund to determine need and to effect an 
equitable distribution among the deceased's dependants and 
nominees.”13 
 
2.2.4 The legal position in South Africa, subject to common law and statutory law 
intervention, is that a person enjoys the freedom to determine upon whom 
his or her estate will devolve in the event of his or her death.  The provisions 
                                                          
11 Ibid at paragraph 7. 
 
12 Dobie NO v National Technikon Retirement Pension Fund (1999) 9 BPLR 29 (PFA) at page 36. 
13 Ibid.at page 36. 
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of section 37C expressly alter a person’s ability to determine who will 
receive the benefit of payment from his or her retirement fund, in the event 
of his or her death.  Accordingly, section 37C is a statutory mechanism 
which alters a person’s freedom of testation.  Neither the provisions of the 
Intestate Succession Act14 nor the last will and testament of a deceased 
member can be used to determine the disposition of a death benefit other 
than where section 37C makes express provision for the death benefit to 
form part of the deceased member’s estate. 
 
2.2.5 The overarching provision of section 37C is that a death benefit 
payable by a fund does not become a part of the deceased fund 
member's estate except insofar as section 37C itself provides for such 
an inclusion.15 One of the main principles of section 37C is that 
members of a fund cannot dictate the manner in which the benefits 
payable upon their deaths, by a pension or provident fund, will be paid 
nor can members dictate to whom such payment will be made.  
Although it is usual practice within the retirement funding industry for 
members to complete a nomination form, such nomination form is not 
binding on the Board and serves only as guidance to the Board as an 
indication of the deceased member’s wishes. The nomination form 
serves a limited purpose as it determines a deceased fund member’s 
nominees but does not give them a greater right to the death benefit 
than the right of any dependant identified by the Board.16 The dilution of 
the member's freedom of testation together with the limited impact of a 
completed nomination form, is a very clear indication of the Legislature's 
intention of ensuring that no dependants of pension fund members, 
regardless of whether such dependants are factual or legal, should be left 
without financial support in the event of the member’s death. This is 
                                                          
14 Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
15 In accordance with section 37C(1)(b) of the Act, the death benefit or a portion thereof may be paid into 
the deceased’s estate where no dependants can be identified but the deceased has nominated 
beneficiaries and the liabilities in the deceased’s estate exceed the assets. In such a case an amount of 
the death benefit which equals the difference in the assets and liabilities of the deceased’s estate must be 
paid into the estate. Further in accordance with section 37C(1)(c) of the Act if a fund cannot trace any 
dependants of a deceased member and such a member has not nominated any beneficiaries then the 
death benefit payable by the fund must be paid into the deceased member’s estate. 
16 Reuters v Telkom Retirement Fund 2003 (3) BPLR 4501 (PFA) at paragrapgh 12 
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intended to have the indirect effect of decreasing the burden on the State 
to provide for these persons and promotes social protection, which is to 
be implemented by Boards.17 
 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
2.3.1 The intention which informed the enaction of section 37C is the 
achievement of a social outcome. As stated above, the social outcome 
that is intended is that the depedants of deceased members do not 
become a burden on the fiscus. The allocation of the death benefit to 
such dependants is intended to give such persons financial means even 
after the death of the person on whom they were dependent, that is, the 
fund member. One of the consequences of section 37C is that the Board 
is then tasked with ensuring that a social purpose is achieved. Social 
aims and considerations differ from person to person and will by their very 
nature differ depending on the facts of a situation. Accordingly, achieving 
a social purpose within the context of a death benefit distribution which 
has no extenuating circumstances attached, is relatively easy, but being 
called upon to achieve a social outcome when the facts are complicated 
and the family situation is one which does not resound with the Board is a 
difficult but not impossible task. It is accepted that the task of the Board is 
a difficult one, such difficulty has often been acknowledged by the 
Adjudicator as is evident in the Dobie18 determination.  Accordingly, by the 
very nature of the section it is inevitable that situations will arise where the 
intended social outcome envisaged by the Legislature, is not satisfied by 
the Board’s distribution of a death benefit. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Op Cit at footnote 1 at page 49. 
18 See supra at 12.at page 41. 
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CHAPTER 3:  TRUSTEES ROLE 
 
3. Role  
 
3.1 Trustee duties  
 
3.1.1 Section 37C cannot be discussed in isolation, as a Board when acting in 
terms of that section is still required to ensure compliance with the other 
provisions of the Act. Accordingly, to the extent that the Act has 
overreaching sections which regulate performance by a Board then a 
Board would need to ensure compliance with such provisions as well as 
with section 37C. The Board has a fiduciary duty to both the fund and its 
members. This fiduciary duty exists in both the common law and 
statutory intervention, that is, is expressly recorded in the Act. Further a 
Board is also obliged to act in accordance with the rules of the relevant 
fund. Thus, if the rules record duties over and above those contained in 
law then the Board would also need to comply with those other duties 
when distributing a death benefit. 
 
3.1.2 The Act, other relevant legislation and the different rules place onerous 
duties on Boards. The Board is tasked not only with the important duty of 
ensuring that the fund is run in a financially responsible manner and is 
maintained in a financially sound manner, but also with a further duty 
to the members of that particular fund. This multifaceted duty looks 
after the interests of at least two personas whose interests and 
outcomes may tend to diverge more often than not. The Board must at 
all times be aware of the duty it owes to the differing stakeholders and 
must be wary of taking decisions which are obviously prejudicial to one 
of the stakeholders for the benefit of the other. The duties of the Board 
are far reaching and are intertwined with numerous provisions of the 
Act. For purposes of this dissertation it is not necessary to consider 
all the facets of the Boards’ duties. This dissertation will only consider 
the interplay between the fiduciary duties of the Board and section 37C. 
Accordingly, this dissertation will only consider the Board's duty to a 
fund and its members, at common law and in terms of the Act, when 





3.1.3 The Adjudicator in the Dobie determination made a profound 
observation of section 37C and stated the following: 
 
“One thing is certain about section 37C, it is a hazardous, 
technical minefield potentially extremely prejudicial to both 
those who are expected to apply it and to those intended to 
benefit from its provisions. It creates anomalies and 
uncertainties rendering it most difficult to apply. There can 
be no doubt about its noble and worthy policy intention. 
The problem lies in the execution and the resultant 
legitimate anxiety felt by those who may fall victim to a 
claim of maladministration in trying to make senses of it. 
Any successful claim for maladministration will be borne 
ultimately by the other members, the participating 
employer, or perhaps even members of the board of 
management”19. 
 
3.1.4 It is acknowledged, not just by the Adjudicator’s office, but throughout 
the retirement funding industry that the distribution of the death benefits 
payable by a Board is fraught with difficulty and is one of the areas in 
which the Board is most vulnerable and at the greatest risk of erring. 
Although the Act gives express guidelines as to who should be 
considered as a dependant for purposes of the section and the section 
places an obligation on Boards to effect a distribution in a specified 
manner, neither the Act nor the section expressly indicates to Boards 
what factors should be considered when the Board is called upon to 
give effect to the provisions of section 37C. This is where the wide 
discretion which has been granted to Boards becomes a pertinent and 
somewhat worrying issue as a Board is required to ensure compliance 
with its fiduciary duties by employing tools which it has formulated, if 
any.  
 
3.2 Common law and statutory obligations  
 
                                                          
19 See supra at footnote 12 at page 41. 
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3.2.1 In order to fully understand what a Board is required to do to comply 
with the provisions of section 37C it is necessary to understand what 
common law and statutory duties a Board must adhere to. The 
common law duties of trustees are well established. These common 
law duties that are relevant to the relationship between a Board, a fund 
and its members have been codified and have been recognised in 
sections 7C and 7D of the Act.  
 
3.2.2 The common law fiduciary duties of trustees were summarised as 
follows in the Mouton Committee Report:20 
 
“To act with due care: the standard of care required is greater 
than that of the reasonable person. The duty is to act with 
diligence. To ensure the above standard of care when 
matters relevant to the fund's administration and 
management are being considered, trustees should follow a 
carefully worked out agenda which will reinforce the discipline 
required. The trustees must keep members fully acquainted with 
matters relevant to their status such as changes to benefit 
structures, legislation and their rights and obligations thereto. To 
act in good faith: there are no degrees of good faith. This is 
important since any judgment of a trustee' action is based on 
an unqualified standard of good faith, e.g. a breach of good no 
matter how minor, means that the trustees' action is mala fides 
or in bad faith. There are no degrees of good faith, only good 
faith and mala fides. To hold assets for the benefit of the fund 
and its members: a trustee must be satisfied that only 
members and their beneficiaries benefit from the fund's assets. 
Thus a trustee must ensure that any person regarded by them 
as a beneficiary is indeed a beneficiary and correctly entitled to 
benefits. Therefore, for example, a trustee must receive 
adequate confirmation that anyone claiming to be a spouse or 
orphan and therefore entitled to receive a spouse's or orphan's 
pension, is indeed so entitled. To avoid conflicts of interest: 
The trustee is required to maintain an independent and 
                                                          
20 “Report of the Committee of Investigation into Retirement Provision System for South Africa”, 1992. 
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dispassionate interest in the affairs of the fund and at the 
same time promote the interests of its various beneficiaries to 
the exclusion of all else. This duty includes the obligation to 
disclose any conflict of interest…To hold assets for the 
benefit of the fund and its members: A trustee may not 
have any personal interest in trust property…Act with 
impartiality: This means that all members must receive equal 
and objective treatment from the trustee. A trustee may not 
discriminate or act against the interest of one member to the 
benefit of others.” 
 
3.2.3 Numerous rulings by the Adjudicator take the view that the section 7C 
and D provisions of the Act introduced and constitute no more than a 
restatement of the existing law and are merely a codification of 
trustees’ common law duties.21 Section 7C(1) appears to say no more 
than that the board of management shall manage the fund in accordance 
with the rules and law while sections 7C(2) and 7D itemise the 
fiduciary duties and general duties that trustees or members of the 
board have in respect of the fund. A failure to comply with these 
requirements does not constitute an offence in terms of section 37 and 
there are no prescribed penalties.22   
 
3.2.4 Accordingly, for purposes of this dissertation it is not necessary to 
consider the impact of a Board’s common law fiduciary duties in 
respect of the provisions of section 37C as these duties are exactly the 
same as those which are recorded in sections 7C and 7D of the Act.  
 
3.2.5 Section 7C23 records the objects of the Board, which are in effect to 
                                                          
21 Marx GL and Hanekom K The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee 
Benefits 2009 ed (Lexis Nexis Durban 2009) page 311. 
22 Ibid at page 104. 
23 7C.Object of board.— 
(1) The object of a board shall be to direct, control and oversee the operations of a fund 
in accordance with the applicable laws and the rules of the fund. 
(2) In pursuing its object the board shall— 
(a) take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of members in terms of 
the rules of the fund and the provisions of this Act are protected at all times, 
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direct and control the operations of the fund in accordance with the 
applicable laws and the rules of the fund. Section 7C provides that in 
pursuing its object the Board shall do the following: 
 
• Take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of members 
in terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of the Act are 
protected at all times;   
 
• Act with due care, diligence and good faith; 
 
• Avoid conflicts of interest; and 
 
• Act with impartiality in respect of all members and beneficiaries. 
 
3.2.6 Section 7D24 records the duties of the Board and requires a Board to do 
the following: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
especially in the event of an amalgamation or transfer of any business 
contemplated in section 14, splitting of a fund, termination or reduction of 
contributions to a fund by an employer, increase of contributions of members 
and withdrawal of an employer who participates in a fund; 
(b) act with due care, diligence and good faith; 
(c) avoid conflicts of interest; 
(d) act with impartiality in respect of all members and beneficiaries. 
 
24 7D.Duties of board.—The duties of a board shall be to— 
(a) ensure that proper registers, books and records of the operations of the fund are kept, 
inclusive of proper minutes of all resolutions passed by the board; 
(b) ensure that proper control systems are employed by or on behalf of the board; 
(c) ensure that adequate and appropriate information is communicated to the members of the 
fund informing them of their rights, benefits and duties in terms of the rules of the fund; 
(d) take all reasonable steps to ensure that contributions are paid timeously to the fund in 
accordance with this Act; 
(e) obtain expert advice on matters where board members may lack sufficient expertise; 
(f) ensure that the rules and the operation and administration of the fund comply with this Act, 
the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, 2001 (Act No. 28 of 2001), and all 
other applicable laws. 
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• Ensure that proper registers, books and records of the operations of 
the fund are kept, inclusive of proper minutes of all resolutions 
passed by the Board; 
 
• Ensure that proper control systems are employed by or on behalf of 
the Board; 
 
• Ensure that adequate and appropriate information is communicated 
to the members of the fund informing them of their rights, benefits 
and duties in terms of the rules of the fund; 
 
• Take all reasonable steps to ensure that contributions are paid on 
time; 
 
• Obtain expert advice on matters where Board members may lack 
sufficient expertise; and 
 
• Ensure that the rules and the operation and administration of the 
fund comply with this Act, the Financial Institutions (Protection of 
Funds) Act25 and all other applicable laws.  
 
3.2.7 Accordingly, when effecting a distribution in accordance with section 
37C a Board needs to ensure compliance not just with section 37C but 
also with the provisions of section 7C and 7D of the Act.  
 
3.2.8 The considerations which a Board needs to contemplate when effecting 
a death benefit distribution are not confined within the Act. The 
Registrar also issues circulars and directives in terms of the Act which 
may be relevant to a death benefit distribution. It has been accepted 
that the circulars issued by the Registrar are not law and serve merely 
as guidance on what the Registrar considers to be good practice. 
Directives however have legal force and are binding on a fund, its board 
and members.26 The Registrar has not issued any directives which are 
relevant to section 37C. The Registrar has however issued a circular 
                                                          
25 Act 28 of 2001. 
26 Section 33 of the Act. 
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relevant to good governance27 which records that a Board stands in a 
position of trust or fiduciary relationships to funds and therefore must 
act with integrity. PF Circular 130 clearly contemplates, amongst other 
tasks which are performed by a Board, the distribution of a death benefit 
and the discretion which a Board is called upon to exercise. The 
Registrar’s recommendation to decrease the risk which attaches to 
such a wide discretion appears to be that a Board should introduce 
governance measures which require a certain standard of behaviour of 
a Board.28 Accordingly, a Board which is called upon to make a 
distribution in terms of section 37C is required to comply with section 7C 
and 7D of the Act, the provisions of the section itself and to consider, 
but not necessarily comply with, the provisions of PF Circular 130. PF 
Circular 130 does not appear to add to the duties which must be 
complied with by a Board rather it is more of a guideline which seeks to 
foster compliance with sections 7C and 7D of the Act by expanding and 
explaining the manner in which the Board must act in order to meets its 
objects and duties.  
 
3.3 Exercise of discretion  
 
3.3.1 Notwithstanding the statutory requirements which must be complied 
with, a further complication and an added level of compliance 
attaches to the discretion which must be exercised in every death 
benefit distribution. The distinguishing feature of section 37C is the 
extent of the discretion which the Board is expected to exercise. All 
Boards must understand that where discretion is exercised it cannot 
be exercised in an arbitrary manner. Thus, even if a Board was to 
somehow comply with the Act but the exercise of its discretion was 
flawed, such a Board would be at risk of having its decision 
overturned or tasked to revisit it. Although a Board is not an 
administrative body, it is likely that administrative law principles will 
apply to the exercise of discretion by a Board. South African 
administrative law principles provide that a decision made by the 
Board should be made in a manner which makes the decision least 
                                                          
27 “Good governance of retirement Funds”, PF Circular 130, Financial Services Board, 11 June 2007, 
www.fsb.co.za, last visited 30 September 2011. 
28 Op Cit at paragraph 45. 
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susceptible to challenge. 
 
3.3.2 Our courts have established a number of factors which need to be 
considered by an administrative body when exercising discretion. In 
order to make a challenge of their decision less likely these factors 
should be considered and adopted by the members of the Board when 
exercising discretion associated with section 37C. The factors which 
should be considered are the following: 
 
3.3.2.1 The decision must not be taken for an ulterior purpose or 
motive;29 
 
3.3.2.2 The decision must not be taken in bad faith, that is, the 
decision must not be fraudulent or dishonest;30 and  
 
3.3.2.3 The members of the Board must apply their minds to the issue 
before them.31 
 
3.3.3 The factors set out above are self explanatory and have been given 
much consideration by the Adjudicator. The failure to apply one’s mind 
to an issue is the failure to exercise a power properly. This can result 
from the following: 
 
3.3.3.1 A failure to decide or consider. This means that the Board 
members cannot simply ignore the decision before them as 
this would be an abuse of its discretion; 
 
3.3.3.2 Consideration of all relevant factors and discounting of 
irrelevant factors; 
 
3.3.3.3 Fettering of their discretion, for example by blindly or rigidly 
adhering to policies or guidelines; 
 
3.3.3.4 The members of the Board cannot exercise their discretion in 
                                                          
29 Rikhoto v East Rand Administration Board 1983 (4)SA 278 (W), this decision was confirmed on 
appeal in Oos-Randse Administrasierraad v Rikhoto 1983 (3) SA 595 (A). 
30 Waks v Jacobs 1990 (1) SA 913 (T). 
31 Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Limited 1988 (3) SA 132 (A) at page 322. 
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order to fulfil promises or assurances ; and 
 
3.3.3.5 The members of the Board cannot take the decision in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner. 
 
3.3.4 Notwithstanding the above, the discretion afforded to the members of 
the Board is fettered by the rules of the fund in question and the Act. 
The Board members in exercising their discretion must act in 
accordance with their duties, if any, which are set out in the rules and 
section 7C and 7D of the Act.  
 
3.3.5 Accordingly, members of the Board may only exercise their discretion 
when performing their duties in terms of section 37C in a manner 
which would not result in their contravening their duties, as set out in 
the rules and the Act. It is therefore necessary for the members of the 
Board to consider the constraints placed on their discretion before 
making any decision regarding a distribution of a death benefit.  
 
3.4 Obligations imposed by section 37C 
 
3.4.1 Section 37C contains a three stage process that must be followed by a 
Board, in the event of a member's death, assuming that the rules of 
that particular fund provides for a lump sum benefit to be payable in 
the event of the death of a member. As stated previously where no 
lump sum benefit is payable, section 37C is irrelevant and cannot be 
invoked by a Board.32  
 
3.4.2 Section 37C tasks the Board to do the following:33 
 
3.4.2.1 to determine the potential beneficiaries to be considered in the 
distribution, that is, those persons who satisfy the definition of 
dependant34 in relation to the deceased member and those 
                                                          
32 Shuping v Senwes Pension Fund (PFA/FS/4440/05/SG) at paragraph 5.1. 
33 The tasks are evident on a reading of the section. 
34 As defined in the Act:“dependant”, in relation to a member, means— 
(a) a person in respect of whom the member is legally liable for maintenance; 
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persons, if any, who have been nominated by the deceased 
member as his or her preferred recipients of the death 
benefit;35  
 
3.4.2.2 to determine what portions, in the Board’s view, would be 
equitable benefits for each of the identified potential 
beneficiaries or, if there are only nominees, to determine the 
amounts which are required to be paid to the nominees in 
terms of the nomination form;36 and 
 
3.4.2.3 to determine the appropriate mode of payment to each of the 
identified beneficiaries, to whom the Board has decided to pay 
a benefit, and thereafter to effect payment.37 
 
3.4.3 Over the years major role players within the retirement funding 
industry including the numerous Adjudicators, have made 
important contributions regarding what are considered as being 
relevant considerations. However these considerations can only be 
applied by the Board once the Board is fully aware of what its primary 
duties are.38 
 
3.5 Communication to members  
 
3.5.1 Before even considering the requirements of section 37C and the 
numerous duties placed on the Board, it is necessary to consider a duty 
which in the context of section 37C must precede any of the other 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(b) a person in respect of whom the member is not legally liable for maintenance, if such 
person— 
 
(i) was, in the opinion of the board, upon the death of the member in fact 
dependent on the member for maintenance; 
(ii) is the spouse of the member; 
(iii) is a child of the member, including a posthumous child, an adopted child and 
a child born out of wedlock. 
(c) a person in respect of whom the member would have become legally liable for 
maintenance, had the member not died. 
35 Section 3C(1). 
36 Section 3C(1)(a),(b),(c). 
37 Section 37C(2),(3),(4),(5). 
38 Bushula v Satawu National Provident Fund 2009 (2) BPLR 161(PFA) 
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duties. Section 7D(c) of the Act states that one of the duties of the 
Board is to ensure that adequate and appropriate information is 
communicated to the members of the fund informing them of their 
rights, benefits and duties. The Adjudicator in the 2009/2010 Annual 
Report39 expressly states that a major factor contributing to complaints 
is the poor communication with members and that proper 
communication would obviate the need for a member to complain. 
 
3.5.2 Accordingly, the Board should take all reasonable steps to ensure that 
its members are given sufficient information regarding the manner in 
which section 37C works and the implication of the section on their 
freedom of testation.  I have on a number of occasions, while providing 
training to Boards, been surprised when trustees themselves are 
unaware of the implications of section 37C on their freedom of testation. 
Such reactions are a clear indication that Boards need a greater 
understanding of section 37C and that such training needs to take the 
form of outcomes based learning.  It is vital that members have a good 
understanding of the implications of section 37C. Accordingly, Boards 
should in the course of contracting with their administrators, consider 
whether one of the services which the administrator will be tasked with 
is a member communication which deals solely with section 37C which 
gives members an opportunity to ask pertinent questions. Such a 
communication could also be used as an opportunity to gain insight on 
a member’s family situation. It is reasonable to accept that once the 
Board has made reasonable efforts to educate its membership about 
the implications of section 37C, it has already taken a big step towards 
decreasing the risks associated with section 37C.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
3.6.1 A Board which is called upon to determine a distribution of a death 
benefit must ensure that each of the three steps which they are required 
to satisfy is completed while ensuring that the duties and the obligations 
which are provided by the Act are also satisfied. Thus, for instance if a 
Board is at step one of a death benefit allocation, the Board must 
                                                          
39 Annual Report of the Pension Funds Adjudicator for the year ended 2010: www.pfa.org.za, last 
visited 29 February 2012. 
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ensure that step one is satisfied while also satisfying the requirements 
of section 7C and 7D of the Act and the principles of good governance 
which attach to exercise of discretion. In effect it is the Board’s 
responsibility when dealing with the payment of death benefits to 
conduct a thorough investigation to determine the beneficiaries, to 
thereafter decide on an equitable distribution and finally to decide on the 
most appropriate mode of payment of the benefit payable.40 
 
  
                                                          
40 Coetzee v Central Retirement Annuity Fund (PFA/GA/17436/2007/LTN). 
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CHAPTER 4:  DETERMINATION OF BENEFICIARIES  
 
4. Beneficiaries  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
4.1.1 First and foremost the Board has a duty to determine the potential 
beneficiaries to be considered for receipt of the death benefit. These 
include 'legal dependants’, 'factual dependants', spouses, children, 
future dependants and nominees".41  Accordingly, the first duty of the 
Board, to determine the potential beneficiaries to a death benefit, is 
broken up into two parts, that is, determining whether there are any 
nominees and determining whether the deceased member had any 
dependants at the time of his or her death.42  Before the Board can 
undertake a section 37C process it must ensure that it has all the 
information it requires such as proof of death.43 
 
4.2 Identifying dependants  
 
4.2.1 Determination of the dependants of a deceased member is an 
onerous task which exposes a Board to a great deal of risk. It stands 
to reason that if a Board understands the basic steps associated with 
identifying the dependants of a deceased member then the exposure 
to risk decreases. A Board is required to identify both legal and factual 
dependants. Legal dependants are in essence those dependants 
whom the deceased member would be liable in law to maintain while 
factual dependants are those persons who were factually dependent 
on the member notwithstanding the fact that he or she was not obliged 
in law to provide financial support to the person. It is clear by the very 
nature of the relationships which the Board is called upon to test that a 
Board will not be able to determine dependency without investigating 
the facts associated with each individuals claim to dependency.  
 
                                                          
41 Hunter R et al The Pension Funds Act: A commentary on the Act, regulations, selected 
notices, directives and circulars 2010 ed (Hunter Benefits Law Johannesburg 2010) at page 684. 
42 Mashego v SATU National Provident Fund (PFA/GA/3542/05/VIA) at paragraph 5.4. 




4.2.2 Section 7C(2)(a) and (b) of the Act place an express duty on the 
Board to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of 
members are protected at all times and to act with due care, diligence 
and good faith. These duties clearly place an obligation on the Board 
when investigating the circle of potential beneficiaries to conduct an 
investigation which is carried out with diligence. Accordingly, 
regardless of whether or not the Act gives guidance on the approach 
which must be adopted when carrying out such an investigation, the 
Board has a duty to adopt a process which ensures that the 
investigation is diligent and that the interests of potential beneficiaries 
are not prejudiced.44  
 
4.2.3 To date there is no clear or express set of guidelines in respect of the 
manner in which dependants should be determined or the process to 
be followed when investigating and identifying a deceased member’s 
dependants. In the Zikhali45 determination, the Adjudicator, stated in 
essence that there is a common misconception amongst the parties 
in such matters and the pensions industry at large, that there is a 
duty on a dependant to come forward and inform the Board of his or 
her status and potential entitlements to the death benefit or a portion 
thereof. The wording of section 37C is very clear in this respect and 
there is very little room for argument regarding the onus to identify 
dependants. The onus is firmly on the Board to conduct an 
investigation with a view to tracing the dependants of a deceased 
member. Accordingly, in the event of a death benefit claim it is of the 
utmost importance that the Board take all reasonable and appropriate 
steps to locate the dependants of a deceased member and not simply 
wait for potential dependants to make themselves known. The 
provisions of section 37C are not well understood or known within the 
general public, a circumstance which can be remedied by better 
communication. Thus even if a person is a dependant that person may 
not be aware of his or her potential right to a benefit and may not 
come forward to make such a claim. 
 
                                                          
44 Morgan v SA Druggist Provident Fund 2001 (4) BPLR 1886 (PFA) at paragraph 11. 




4.2.4 The duty to investigate and identify potential beneficiaries is clear but 
by no means equivocal. Boards appear to fail when it comes to the 
actual process of identifying a dependant.46 The burning issue which a 
Board is faced with is what process should be followed and would that 
process be considered reasonable and appropriate by any tribunal 
called upon to adjudicate the process employed by the Board to 
identify dependants. In effect a Board which fails in its identification of 
the dependants will never be able to satisfy the requirements of 
section 37C because the basis upon which the section is premised is 
that the correct dependants have been identified. Accordingly, a failure 
in the identification process will result in the social outcome envisaged 
by the Legislature being thwarted.  
 
4.2.5 The basis of section 37C appears to be that a Board would only 
comply with its duty to investigate and identify dependants and make 
an equitable distribution, if as its starting point, it has correctly 
identified all the dependants. However given the complexities which 
attach to identifying dependants such as the social and economic 
structure of South Africa (many members live in cities while their 
dependants reside in rural areas), it is accepted that a Board is 
unlikely to utilise an identification process which will result in all 
dependants being identified every time there is a death benefit claim.47 
It is evident from the decisions of the Adjudicator that where a Board 
can give evidence that it has utilised a reasonable and diligent 
investigation such a Board will not be held responsible for failing to 
identify a potential beneficiary. Accordingly, the question which 
remains is not whether the Board has identified all the potential 
dependants but whether the Board has reasonably complied with the 
duty to investigate and identify potential dependants as stipulated in 
section 37C coupled with the relevant provisions of section 7C and 
section 7D of the Act. 
 
4.2.6 What is considered reasonable will depend on the facts of the case 
at hand but funds are expected to balance on one hand, the need to 
give effect to the section by identifying all dependants and, on the 
                                                          
46 Nyathi v Leonard Dingler (PTY) Ltd and Others (PFA/GA/3328/05/LCM) at paragraph 7.5. 
47 Supra at footnote 12 at pages 39 and 40. 
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other hand, practical considerations such as the time and cost of 
making such an identification. It is clear from reading numerous 
decisions of the Adjudicator that the Adjudicator requires a Board to 
apply its mind to the facts at hand and to make reasonable enquiries in 
an effort to elicit potential dependants and that the extent of such efforts 
will change depending on the individual facts of the case at hand.48 
Such an approach is laudable as it recognises that no single approach 
can be adopted by a Board to elicit all the dependants in differing death 
benefit distributions. South Africa is a complex country in which people 
have differing levels of education and where access to communication 
is often dependent on a person’s socio-economic standing. It is 
unreasonable therefore for a Board to assume that a person who does 
not understand English will be able to understand a telephone call in 
English and provide the information which is required to prove his or her 
dependency. In such an instance the Board would need to adapt its 
investigation process to meet the language requirements of the 
potential dependant.  
 
4.2.7 It has been accepted that there are different ways to investigate but 
reasonable efforts may include contacting the deceased's members 
family and neighbours to obtain information; contacting the 
member's employer or former colleagues, making inquiries at an 
embassy if the member was not South African, checking medical aid 
records to ascertain if the member identified anyone who could be a 
dependant, requesting unabridged birth certificates (which would 
indicate who the father of a child is), obtaining affidavits from the 
employer, family, neighbours, tribal or religious elders in the area 
where the member lived.49  
 
4.2.8 There is also no reason why the Board cannot advertise in a national 
and local newspaper. The argument may be that this procedure will 
open floodgates of claims for the death benefit, however necessary 
identity documents and other evidence can be requested to confirm 
these claims. Media may be an effective way to alert and identify 
potential dependants especially where a Board is experiencing difficulty. 
                                                          
48 Dyas v CTS Provident Fund and Another 2003 (3) BPLR 4448 (PFA) at paragraph 13.  
49 Mthabela v Sappi Provident Fund 2004 (7) BPLR 5915 (PFA) at page 5918. 
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In the Mthiyane50 determination it was accepted by the Adjudicator that, 
in the absence of any rebutting evidence, affidavits could be regarded 
as proof of the identity of the member's dependants beyond a balance 
of probabilities. Other methods might include the use of a tracing 
agent and placing advertisements in the newspapers circulating in 
the area where the member lived.51 
 
4.2.9 The Adjudicator is empowered, in terms of section 30E of the Act, to 
investigate a complaint and to make an order which any court of law 
may make. Given the wide powers of determination, the Adjudicator 
has over the years made a number of determinations, in the context of 
section 37C, which have resulted in the substitution of the Board’s 
decision with the Adjudicator’s own distribution52 or ordering the Board 
to revisit its decision.53 The Adjudicator’s determinations have on a 
regular basis determined that the errant funds are liable for interest 
which accumulates on the benefit payable. Although the 
determinations have no precedential value, they have served as a 
guide to Boards, which are wary of a complaint being laid against 
them and being decided in favour of the complainant.  Further, the 
determinations also serve as a warning to Boards that there is a 
readily available complaints process which can be inexpensively 
accessed by its members or their beneficiaries and which will readily 
find against them if the Adjudicator is of the view that there has been 
no compliance with section 37C.  Over the years the Adjudicator’s 
determinations have given Boards a number of clues on what will be 
considered to be acceptable and reasonable endeavours employed to 
determine a dependant.54 
 
4.3 Status of a nomination form  
 
4.3.1 The default position adopted by a number of Boards is to rely on the 
deceased member's nomination form, such a reliance is contrary to the 
                                                          
50 Mthiyane v Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & Others (2) 2002 (5) BPLR 3460 (PFA) paragraph 27. 
51 Supra at footnote 16. 
52 As a general rule where discretion has been improperly exercised our courts are reluctant to 
substitute their own decision for that of the functionary’s, but tend to refer the matter back to the initial 
decision maker, unless exceptional circumstances exist. 
53 Ditshabe v Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund 2001 (10) BPLR 2574 (PFA) at page 2578. 
54 Supra at footnote 49.  
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intention and spirit of section 37C and may result in a situation which 
promotes a dependant becoming dependent on the State. In the case of 
R Bouwer v Central Retirement Annuity Fund55 the Adjudicator expressly 
stated that it is the Board’s responsibility when dealing with the payment of 
death benefits to conduct a thorough investigation to determine the 
dependants and that although, the deceased may have nominated a 
beneficiary such a nomination is only one of many factors which will be 
considered when effecting a distribution. Even though the wording of 
section 37C is express and is abundantly clear that when determining 
dependants, reliance cannot be placed solely on the nomination form, 
every year a number of complaints are referred to the Adjudicator which 
show unreasonable reliance on the recordal in the nomination form. In the 
Matlakane determination the Adjudicator stated that section 37 
makes it clear that the freedom of testation and intestate succession 
are overridden by the provisions of the section. Thus the content of the 
nomination form does not in law entitle a nominee to ipso facto receive 
the death benefit.56   
 
4.3.2 The Adjudicator appears to have adopted the correct position and the 
determinations mirror the requirements of section 37C.  To the extent 
that it may be claimed that section 37C is not clear, the Adjudicator has 
made it clear, that possession of a completed nomination form does 
not relieve the Board of its duty to investigate and identify dependants 
as required by section 37C. The South African landscape requires such 
an active investigation given that it is a country known for migrant labour. 
In the absence of a proper investigation geared towards identifying all 
dependants, dependants who live in rural areas are unlikely to be 
identified, and will be left without financial support notwithstanding 
their financial dependence on the member at the time of death. Such 
an outcome is not just contrary to the intention of the section but is also 
a contravention of the Act and more specifically section 7D(f) of the Act 
which requires compliance with the Act and other applicable laws. 
 
4.3.3 The Board is expressly not bound by a will nor is it bound by the 
                                                          
55 R Bouwer v Central Retirement Annuity Fund PFA/GA/2789/2005/RM at page 3. 




nomination form. The contents of a nomination form are therefore 
merely a guide to the trustees when exercising their discretion.57 It is 
evident that regardless of whether the individual trustees or the Board 
agrees with the curtailing of a deceased members freedom of testation, 
they are not at liberty to discard the provisions of the Act and place 
complete emphasis on the contents of the nomination form. The duty of the 
Board, which trumps all other duties, is to ensure compliance with the Act, 
which Act expressly requires the Board to investigate and determine who 
the dependants of a deceased member are. 
 
4.3.4 The paternalism inherent in the section and the effect on freedom of 
testation has been criticised in different arenas and numerous 
arguments have considered whether it is in the interests of dependants 
that the Board, with reference to the Act, determines the circle of 
beneficiaries and effects a distribution amongst them by not 
necessarily following the wishes of the deceased.58 It does not appear 
that such a discussion will result in change however it intimates that there is 
a possibility of a Board member having such a view.  
 
4.3.5 Although a Board cannot, without contravening the Act, rely on the 
deceased members wishes as recorded in the nomination form, the 
nomination form is a good starting point in an investigation to identify 
dependants of a deceased member. The nomination form plays an 
integral part in identifying beneficiaries and should not be discarded as 
being of no importance. The contents of the nomination form may, in 
the absence of any other information, serve as a starting point for an 
investigation. The Board can use the nomination form as a basis to 
identify nominees and can also then question those nominees about 
the life of the deceased member in an effort to identify persons who 
may be categorised as dependants. It is also usual for the nomination 
form to contain next of kin information which may not be recorded in 
any other documentation held by the fund or the deceased member’s 
employer. 
 
4.3.6 To the extent that the Board places any reliance on a nomination form 
                                                          
57 Mashazi v African Products  Retirement Benefit Provident Fund (2002) 8BPLR 70 (W). 
58 Mcdonald 'Section 37C- a view from the other side’ (2004) 2 Pensions World South Africa 7-9. 
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whether such reliance is to identify the nominees or as an indication of 
the members next of kin, the Board must satisfy itself that the 
nomination form is authentic. A Board cannot simply recognise the 
recorded person(s) as potential beneficiaries. A Board must ensure 
that the nomination is written, indicates the nominees with reasonable 
certainty and is valid. Practically, the only way to ascertain the 
authenticity of the nomination form is to ensure that it was signed by 
the deceased member. Once a Board is satisfied that the nomination 
form is valid and the nominees can be identified with reasonable 
certainty, such person must be added to the circle of potential 
beneficiaries. 
 
4.3.7 One of the strongest criticism levied against Boards, insofar as 
nomination forms go, is their failure to ensure that members are given 
regular opportunities to provide updated indications of their wishes, 
that is, Boards do not ensure that nomination forms are completed at 
reasonable intervals ensuring that the information which they have is, 
in the event of a member’s death, likely to be current. Section 7C(2)(a) 
of the Act expressly provides that the Board must take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that the interests of its members in terms of its rules 
and the provisions of the Act are protected at all times. It could be 
successfully argued that a member has an interest in ensuring that at 
the time of his death the person(s) who he or she would like to secure 
financially is considered by the Board to be a beneficiary. Accordingly 
it is evident that an important step in identifying the beneficiaries is to 
ensure that members are regularly informed that they may change 
their wishes recorded in their nomination form and be given sufficient 
opportunities to effect any changes.  
 
4.4 Prudent mechanisms aimed at identifying dependant 
 
4.4.1 Section 37C expressly contemplates a nomination form but it makes 
no further mention of any tools which Boards can use to determine 
dependants. Boards should use the non-directory wording of the 
section as an opportunity to implement tools which can be used as a 
platform for the investigation and identification of dependants. It is 
reasonable, given the nature of the Board’s duties, to assume that it 
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will be called on at least once in the financial year to perform its 
section 37C obligations.  Accordingly, it is also reasonable to ensure 
that a Board should collect as much information as possible from its 
members while they are living and are able to give the Board ‘clues’ 
regarding who should be considered for classification as their 
dependants.  
 
4.4.2 It appears evident from the number of complaints which are lodged 
with the Adjudicator regarding the determination of dependants that 
the Board needs to adopt more tools which are aimed at assisting 
them to correctly identify dependants. The standard nomination 
form used by most funds which requires the same information as an 
insurance policy nomination form is not adequate. Pension funds 
should consider introducing a form for completion, which requires a 
member during his or her life time to record all the details of all the 
people who the member perceives as being financially or legally 
dependant on him or her. For purposes of this dissertation I will refer 
to such a form as a dependant recordal form. If such a form is 
completed by a member then the Board would, at the very least, have 
an indication of the persons whom the member believed to be his or 
her dependants in the event of such a member’s death. Boards who 
adopt such a form will not be alleviated of the obligation to investigate 
and identify dependants, the form will merely be an aid in such an 
investigation. This would mean that the investigation to identify 
dependants would not be an uninformed exercise without a 
reasonable, well founded starting point. The Board could start the 
investigations by determining whether the persons recorded on the 
dependant recordal form are dependants. The form could also act as a 
basis for testing claims of dependency. The investigating process can 
thereafter be a less stringent exercise which entails confirming the 
mentioned status of the persons as dependants, whether they 
predeceased the deceased member or not, determining whether there 
are any other persons who are dependants but are not recorded on the 
dependant recordal form. This may effectively render a 12 month 
investigation period sufficient and result in the benefit being 




4.4.3 Another measure could be the provision of a summary of the workings 
of section 37C at the back of the nomination form which is recorded in 
very simple language and aimed at providing an understanding to 
members and ultimately giving the Board direction.  
 
4.5 Assistance from administrator to identify dependants 
 
4.5.1 The usual process adopted by funds is that the actual investigation of 
potential dependency is undertaken by a fund’s administrator. This is 
acceptable as the intention of the section is not to ensure that every 
single investigation is actually conducted by the Board. Where the 
investigation is done by an administrator or a death benefit sub-
committee, the Board must still satisfy its section 37C obligations, that 
is, if the administrator makes an incorrect identification of a 
dependant, the Board would still be responsible for such a 
misdirection of its duties.59 Where a Board opts to use an 
administrator, the Board would be contravening its duties, more 
especially section 7D(b) of the Act which requires proper control 
systems to be put in place, if it does not oversee the administrator. A 
Board which uses its administrator to conduct the investigation should 
put in place a reporting protocol which ensures that the Board gets 
regular feedback on the investigation, the methods used to identify 
dependants, information which the investigator believes is still 
outstanding, provides the Board with case notes and gives the Board 
an opportunity to ask questions and direct that certain steps be taken. 
The idea of such a protocol is that the Board would be given an 
opportunity to ask relevant questions and to ensure that the 
investigation is diligent, that is, the Board would have oversight of an 
investigation which it is in any event responsible for.  
 
4.5.2 Regardless of the mechanisms which are adopted by Boards to 
regulate investigations it is important that a Board does not fetter its 
discretion by simply rubberstamping a recommendation of an 
                                                          
59 Liutloileng v Municipal Councilors Pension Fund (PFA/GA/5520/05/VIA) the Adjudicator clearly 
stated in this decision that the investigation required to be carried out by a Board should not be limited 
to the information provided by a third party, but should be a thorough investigation conducted 
independently by the trustees. 
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administrator or a sub-committee.60 Where a Board fetters its 
discretion in such a way, the Board will not be complying with its 
duties and will be held accountable by the Adjudicator or other 
relevant tribunal if a distribution is challenged.  
 
4.5.3 Accordingly, a Board must be prudent and cautious when using sub-
committees and/or its administrator to identify dependants. Where the 
Board uses an administrator, the Board must ensure that it has a 
contractual remedy on which it may rely to recover any financial 
prejudice suffered by the fund, where the administrator has conducted 
a poor investigation and has not taken all the relevant facts into 
consideration. Having such an agreement in place means that the 
Board may be liable for the incorrect death benefit distribution but it 
will have recourse against the administrator should the fund suffer any 
loss as a result of the administrator’s actions. 
 
4.5.4 Perhaps an obligation should be placed on the administrators of funds to 
encourage members to update their nomination forms on a regular basis. 
It is unacceptable that a nomination form is only completed when a 
person becomes a member of a fund. Board’s should, where possible, 
ensure that their service agreements with administrators provide for 
member communication regarding the operation of section 37C and an 
opportunity for a member to receive communication, at least annually, 
which seeks to prompt a member to consider whether he or she should 
amend the information recorded in the nomination form. 
 
4.5.5 Conclusion  
 
4.5.6 The Adjudicator does not provide statistics which record the number of 
death benefit complaints which are received which relate to the 
identification of beneficiaries but from a reading of the determinations 
it is evident that there are sufficient cases to determine that Board’s 
are not complying with their duty to identify potential beneficiaries, 
especially dependants. It is also evident from the determinations that 
the incorrect identification of the beneficiaries is because in most 
                                                          
60 Sentsho v University of South Africa and Others (PFA/GA/3939/05/VIA at paragraph 6.4.  
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instances the Boards do not understand the role imposed on them by 
virtue of section 37C when determining the circle of beneficiaries.  
 
4.5.7 The identification of nominees is a relatively simple exercise which 
calls for very little input from a Board and which in the absence of very 
unusual circumstances a Board is unlikely to get incorrect. 
 
4.5.8 Accordingly, one of the reasons which contributes to the numerous 
Adjudicator complaints, in relation to section 37C, is the Board’s failure 





CHAPTER 5:  THE 12 MONTH TIME FRAME 
 
5. Timeframe  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
5.1.1 The next task of the Board, imposed by section 37C(1)(b), is to ensure 
that the distribution of the death benefit is effected within a reasonable 
time frame. Section 37C makes references to the distribution being 
effected at the very least after a period of 12 months from the date of 
the death of the member. The question which then arises is whether 
the Board has a duty to effect a distribution within 12 months. 
 
5.1.2 The determination in Jacobs NO v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and 
Another 61 illustrates the complexities of the time constraints perfectly. 
The complainant, Mr Jacobs (the executor of the deceased’s estate), 
used the 12 month time frame to support his arguments as to why the 
death benefit should be paid into the deceased’s estate. The argument, 
which formed the basis of the complaint, was that given that the 
second respondent had failed to prove her claim to the benefit or a part 
of the benefit within a period of 12 months, the fund was required to 
pay over the benefit to the deceased estate to be distributed by the 
executor to the deceased's heirs.62 
 
5.1.3 Another pertinent submission made by Mr Jacobs was that  
 
“Section 37C of the Act read within its context and the 
constitutional framework in which it exists, requires a decision 
to determine the dependant and a decision on distribution to 
be effected within the twelve month period following the death 
of the member. Consequently, it is alleged to be ultra vires for 
the fund to make any such decisions after the expiry of such 
period and the fund is in mora to the estate.”63  
 
                                                          
61 Jacobs NO v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and Another (2001) 1 BPLR 1488 (PFA). 
62 Ibid at paragraph 6.  
63 Ibid at paragraph 8.2. 
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5.1.4 The Adjudicator expressly stated that the duty to investigate potential 
dependants lies with the Board and that the failure of the second 
respondent to prove her claim within 12 months was not relevant.  
 
5.1.5 The very intention of section 37C is to ensure that the dependants are 
provided for even after a member’s death. It is probable that where a 
distribution is not effected within a reasonable time frame, which time 
frame should be determined with reference to the facts at hand and 
not solely to the time frame in section 37C(1)(b), the dependants are 
likely to suffer financial prejudice.  
 
5.2 Interpretation of time frame  
 
5.2.1 The usual position is that the Board has twelve months within which to 
trace and identify the dependants who may share in the benefit. Firstly 
in this regard, the duty to trace and identify dependants rests with the 
Board and it must take all reasonable steps to identify the dependants. 
As discussed earlier in this dissertation there is no duty, on a 
dependant to come forward and prove that he or she is a dependant.64 
Secondly, there is also no compulsion on the Board to make payment 
after twelve months has lapsed, if the Board is of the opinion that there 
is a need for further investigation.65 
 
5.2.2 The Adjudicator held in the determination of Mthiyane v Fedsure Life 
Assurance Ltd and Others66 that section 37C(1)(b) does not impose 
the time frame of 12 months upon beneficiaries or potential 
beneficiaries. The latter are not under any duty to lodge their claims 
within a 12 month period. Rather it is a time frame imposed on the 
trustees who may not distribute the benefit solely to nominees before 
the lapse of 12 months.67 
 
5.2.3 Section 37C(1)(b) appears on first contemplation to require a Board to 
                                                          
64 Mthiyane v Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others (2) [2002] 5 BPLR 3460 at paragraph 29. 
65 Ibid at paragraph 16. 
66 Ibid at paragraph 15. 
 
67 Tukishi Manamela “Chasing away the ghost in death benefits: a closer look at section 37C of the 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956” (2005) 17 SA Merc LJ. 
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make a distribution within 12 months and if no dependants are 
determined within that period then it appears to place an obligation on 
the Board to pay the death benefit to the nominees. Such an 
interpretation is likely to have an outcome which is contrary to the 
rationale which informed the promulgation of the section and which 
may cause the Board to be acting outside of its duties and obligations.   
 
5.2.4 A common analysis of the time frame is that section 37C (1)(b) places a 
duty on the Board after a lapsing of 12 months, where no dependants 
have been identified, to pay the benefit to the nominees. This 
interpretation considers the period to be a sort of suspensive condition 
for payment.68 
 
5.2.5 If the necessary implication of the time period is that the Board must 
make a distribution within 12 months then many Boards would be 
tempted not to investigate the existence of potential dependants and 
rather wait for the expiration of the 12 month period and then give 
effect to the deceased member’s wishes as recorded in the 
nomination form. Such as action could have the potential impact of 
causing the dependants (whether financial or legal) to be without 
financial resources, ultimately becoming the responsibility of the State. 
To the extent that such an interpretation is correct, it must be 
considered whether it would impede on the duty of the Board to 
investigate the existence of dependants. There is no doubt that it 
would. Boards would then be faced with two competing duties, that is, 
the duty to effect a distribution within 12 months and the duty to use 
reasonable endeavours to investigate the existence of dependants.  
This could very realistically result in a situation where the Board has 
not exhausted its investigation attempts, notwithstanding that it has 
been diligently conducting its investigation, but has reached the 12 
month time frame. In such a situation the Board would be in the 
unacceptable position of rating the duties. In such an instance it is 
probable that some Boards may take the view that satisfying the time 
frame requirement is most important while other Boards may decide 
that conducting a reasonable investigation supersedes any other duty. 
                                                          
68 Ibid  
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If the interpretation is such that it results in competing duties (duty to 
conduct a reasonable, diligent investigation versus the duty to effect a 
distribution within 12 months) it is probable that different principles will 
be used to determine a distribution resulting in very confusing law and 
uncertainty in the application of the section. Such an outcome would 
mean that a potential beneficiary would not have a clear 
understanding as to his or her rights and would not be in a position to 
obtain an indication of the merits of his or her claim to the benefit or 
portion thereof. Further, it has the potential to result in a frustrating of 
the Legislature’s intention. Accordingly, it appears that the time frame 
imposed by section 37C(1)(b) is unlikely to be interpreted by a dispute 
resolution tribunal as requiring a payment to a dependant(s) within 12 
months of the date of death of the member failing which a fund is 
obliged to make payment to the nominee(s). 
 
5.2.6 It is evident, both from the decisions of the Adjudicator69 and the 
various writings which consider the duties of the Board insofar as the 
time frame goes, that there are differing interpretations of what the 
obligations imposed on a Board by section 37C(1)(b) are. It appears 
from the determinations that the 12 month time frame should be 
considered by the Board to be a marker which it should attempt to 
meet however, while striving to meet this target is to be applauded, the 
Board cannot make a distribution after it has reached the 12 month 
time line if it has not taken all reasonable steps to ascertain 
dependants or is not convinced that all beneficiaries have been 
identified. This view is accepted as being sensible.70 Accordingly, a 
Board should never be dilatory and should ensure that it uses the 12 
months to discharge its obligations. Further to the extent that the time 
frame is interpreted as being compelling such an interpretation would 
compete with section 7C(2)(d) of the Act which expressly provides that 
a Board must act with diligence and due care. A Board should be 
concerned about falling foul of this provisions as it places an express 
obligation on them. It is highly probable that a Board could, at the 
expiration of the 12 month time period, take the view that it has not 
                                                          
69 Mofokeng v Millenium Entertainment Group Provident Fund (PFA/GA/11337/2006/CMS); Paris and 
Other v Servochem Retirement Plan (PFA/GA/9086/06/FM). 
70 Supra footnote 8, Marx and Hanekom at page 211. 
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complied with section 7C(2)(d) of the Act, as it has not identified all 
dependants, in which case it would possibly be held to be negligent for 
a Board to effect a distribution.  
 
5.2.7 It may be prudent where a Board has reached the 12 month marker, 
for the distribution to serve before the Board and the Board to consider 
the death benefit payable together with the beneficiaries who have 
been identified up to that stage and the investigation processes which 
has been employed. The Board would then need to decide whether, 
based on the information before it, any tribunal called upon to decide 
the reasonableness of the investigation would be satisfied with the 
Board’s actions. If the answer is in the negative then the Board should 
initiate further investigations and call for the distribution to serve again 
within a very short period. In such cases the Board should also advise 
the identified beneficiaries that it is still investigating the matter with 
diligence.  Such a communication is likely to mitigate the risk of an 
identified beneficiary lodging a premature complaint with the 
Adjudicator which would need to be responded to by the Board and 
may result in unwarranted costs being expended by the fund. It may 
also be prudent for a Board which finds itself in such a situation to 
advise the identified beneficiaries that it is in their best interest to wait 
for the outcome of the Board’s decision, which is being diligently 
attended to, as lodging a matter with the Adjudicator could unduly 
delay the distribution as the Adjudicator is experiencing a backlog 
which has resulted in determinations often only being handed down 2 
years after the lodging of a complaint.  
 
5.3 Adjudicator’s interpretation  
 
5.3.1 The Adjudicator appears to have adopted a wide interpretation of 
section 37C(1)(b)71 which is that the duty to pay is not dependent on 
the expiry of the twelve month period, but rather on whether the Board is 
satisfied that it has investigated and considered the matter with due 
diligence and is in a position to make an equitable allocation. The 
question of whether the Board acted properly under section 
                                                          
71 Supra at footnote 12 at page 40. 
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37C(1)(a) will therefore not necessarily be determined with reference 
to the time frame. The relevant question will always be whether the 
Board took all reasonable steps to identify and trace all possible 
dependants, so as to allow them to distribute the benefit in the most 
equitable manner to the correctly identified dependants. The 
Adjudicator has made it clear that the wide interpretation of section 
37C(1)(b) does not mean that the Board can be dilatory in making a 
decision and that where a Board without good reason fails to take a 
decision timeously, it will amount to maladministration.72 
 
5.3.2 It is evident from the decisions referred to above, that the Adjudicator 
has adopted a practical interpretation of the time frame, that is, the 
Adjudicator will not just determine whether a 12 month period has 
lapsed but if such a period has lapsed will give consideration to the 
reasons why the Board has not affected a distribution within such a 
period.  
 
5.3.3 The Adjudicator has adopted the approach, where a Board is dilatory in 
conducting the investigation and the delay is unreasonable, of ordering a 
fund to complete its investigation and to distribute the benefit together 
with interest at a specified rate from the date which is 12 months after the 
death of a member.73 Where such an order is made, a fund or its 
members could seek against the individual members of the Board for 
any financial prejudice suffered as a result of their conduct. According to 
the Adjudicator, in two recent cases two provident funds are being 
investigated for possible gross dereliction of their duty after two 
claimants had to wait years for the death benefit to be distributed. The 
Adjudicator’s view is that the failure to pay was as a result of the funds 
failing to discharge their duties. The Adjudicator in both those cases 
instructed that a copy of the determinations be forwarded to the 
Registrar as well as the head: surveillance and enforcement at the 
Registrar’s office, for possible action against the trustees of the funds for 
what would appear to be a gross dereliction of their duties.74  
                                                          
72 http”//www.pfa.org.zasitesmart/uploads/files/F9E17074-09AE-44BC-388B-406F756A0AD7.pdf, last 
visited lasted visited 30 September 2011. 
73 Johnathan v Illovo Sugar Pension Fund (PFA/WE/12230/2007/PM). 
74 “Adjudicator probes two funds”, www.fin24.com/economy/Adjudicator (last visited 30 September 




5.4 Considerations for Boards  
 
5.4.1 Over the past years the 12 month period has been interpreted to mean 
that payment made before the expiry of such period is premature and 
defective but that interpretation is unlikely to be accepted as it could 
result in defeating the Legislature’s intention. Boards must adopt a test 
which has reference to whether it has identified all the dependants by 
employing a reasonable investigation process and once the Board is 
satisfied, a distribution should made, notwithstanding whether 12 months 
has expired or not. 
 
5.4.2 Boards must act prudently and ensure that they employ proper control 
systems which have as their aim the diligent and reasonable 
investigation with a proposed completion timeframe of 12 months. 
Boards should endeavour as far as possible to ensure that the trustees 
have the necessary skill and expertise to execute their duties within a 
reasonable time. A Board which has an express duty to protect the 
interests of its members cannot reasonably argue that an 
investigation which has not been diligently carried out and is carried 
out through its own fault, sometime after the 12 month period has 
passed, has not resulted in them being negligent of their duties.  
 
5.4.3 Where a Board can foresee that its investigation will not be completed 
at the expiration of 12 months then nothing prevents a Board from 
making an interim distribution to those beneficiaries whom the Board 
has unequivocally identified and who will definitely receive a portion 
of the benefit when a final distribution is made. If a Board takes such 
a course then even if the investigation takes more than 12 months, 
the Board is unlikely to receive an adverse result from a tribunal as 
there is unlikely to be prejudice suffered. However, adopting such a 
course is not without risk. The Board would need to ensure that it 
implements a protocol or procedure which mitigates any risk that the 
Board may face such as: an interim payment to a person who is 
determined not to be a beneficiary at the time of the final distribution 
or an interim payment which is in excess of the final amount awarded 
to the beneficiary when the final allocation is made.  The payment of 
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an interim benefit to a potential beneficiary cannot fetter the discretion 
of the Board when effecting a final distribution, that is, the Board 
should not consider any advance payments made to any beneficiary 
when effecting the final distribution. The risk then is if the Board 
determines that a beneficiary who received an interim payment 
should in fact receive less than was advanced in which case the 
Board would need to recover such overpayment.75 Ideally if a Board 
implements an interim payment mechanism it should, to mitigate any 
potential risk, ensure that it has an agreement in place with the 
recipient of such payment, which agreement provides for rights of 
recovery and set off in favour of the fund.  
 
5.4.4 The 12 month period is not without cause for concern and has the 
potential to operate to the prejudice of beneficiaries. A pertinent 
consideration is that the trustees are not permanent employees of a 
fund. In fact they usually serve for a certain specific term depending 
on the rules of the specific fund. Accordingly, should a trustee's term 
with the fund end whilst the Board is still investigating and attempting 
to identify beneficiaries, it means that the newly appointed trustees 
will need to go through a period of familiarising themselves with the 
matter before progress is achieved. Unfortunately this leads to further 
delaying payment of the benefit which can no doubt lead to a 
frustration on the side of the beneficiaries and potentially a loss of trust 
in the Board. 
 
5.4.5 The Constitution76 grants everyone the right to just administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and therefore it is 
reasonable to expect the same from the Board.77 Accordingly, even on a 
constitutional analysis it is likely that a Board will be required to show a 
concerted effort at investigating the distribution and have to give plausible 
reasons as to why the distribution could not be finalised within the 
specified time frame.  
 
5.4.6 Although the Adjudicator appears to have given the application of 
                                                          
75 Supra at footnote 2 and 3. 
76 See section 33 of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
77 Supra at footnote 51. 
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the 12 month period a wide interpretation which takes into 
consideration the practical implications of the section, Boards 
should not discard the implications of the golden rule78 of statutory 
interpretation which requires a reader to give effect to the plain 
meaning of the words as they are read unless such an 
interpretation would result in absurdity. However, it could be argued 
that using the golden rule of interpretation would lead to an 
absurdity as it would result in the very intention of the legislation 
being subverted. Given that the 12 month time frame has not yet 
been expressly considered by our courts, there is no certainty as to 
the approach which a court would take and whether such an 
approach would result in Boards having to ensure that the 
distribution is completed within 12 months. If the Adjudicator were 
to give a determination which took the view that a Board had acted 
unreasonably in not completing the distribution within the required 
time frame then it may prudent, if the Board is of the view that it 
acted reasonably, for that Board to test the Adjudicator’s 
determination in a high court.  
 
5.4.7 The Adjudicator has adopted an interpretation which is practical and 
which seeks to give effect to the intention of the section but there is 
no certainty as to whether a court called upon to consider the issue 
will take the same stance. There is a possibility that a court could 
interpret the section as requiring a Board to give effect to the 
distribution within a 12 month period regardless of whether it has 
conducted a proper investigation. In such a case, it would not be 
improbable for a dependant who was not traced and who can show 
that no reasonable efforts were made to trace him or her, to sue the 
fund or the Board. Accordingly, it is in the best interest of all 
stakeholders that a diligent investigation is conducted and a 
distribution made, where appropriate, within the 12 month time 
frame.  In light of the above, the most prudent position which a Board 
can adopt, is in the normal course, to effect a distribution of a death 
benefit within 12 months unless they are of the view that extenuating 
                                                          
78 Joubert JA in Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767E-768E - According to the 
golden rule of interpretation the language in a document is to be given its grammatical and ordinary 




circumstances exist which would support a decision to effect a 
distribution after 12 months has expired.  
 
5.4.8 In light of the above, it is my recommendation, that Boards in an 
effort to ensure compliance with their statutory duties and 
obligations should consider implementing processes which seek to 
mitigate the potential risks which attach to the 12 month time frame.  
Boards should consider adopting a protocol or standard operating 
procedure which aligns itself with the time frame. Further to the 
extent that the Board is one which has a large number of trustees 
or which is of the view that its death benefit distribution process is 
affected when new appointments are made, then consideration 
should be given to adopting a process in terms of which the fund’s 
administrator makes available to a new trustee a full pack of 
documents relating to each unresolved death benefit allocation so 
that that trustee can apply his or her mind to the issues and be 
prepared well in advance of the next Board meeting. The Board 
should seek to implement a process which results in very little 
detriment to the section 37C process as a result of new 
appointments.   
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
5.5.1 The differences in opinion regarding the implications of the time 
frame and the decisions of the Adjudicator, appear to have resulted 
in Boards taking a view that it is normal for a death benefit 
distribution to take more than 12 months. Such a practice is unlikely 
to be determined to be correct and Boards should be wary of not 
actively considering the time frame when determining their section 
37C process or protocol. The 12 month period is often used by 
Boards as an indication that they should take the matter seriously 
and become more actively involved in the death benefit allocation. 
Adopting such a process may place the Board and the fund at risk 
of financial prejudice and should be actively frowned upon by 
Boards.   
 
5.5.2 It is evident from the Adjudicator’s determinations that Boards do 
53 
 
not understand the implications of not acting with diligence and 
meeting the 12 month time frame. It is also evident that Boards are 
not fully aware of the possibility of the fund suffering financial 
prejudice as a result of not completing the distribution timeously 
which in turn may result in a claim against the Board members in 





CHAPTER 6:  ALLOCATION OF BENEFIT 
 
6. Benefit payment  
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
6.1.1 Section 37C requires a Board to distribute the death benefit once the 
circle of beneficiaries has been established. In accordance with the 
provisions of section 37C(1) there are five possible scenarios within 
which an allocation may occur. The possible allocations provided for 
are the following: 
 
6.1.1.1 If dependants have been identified and there are no nominees 
then the Board must pay the benefit to the identified 
dependants in a manner which the Board deems to be 
equitable. The benefit may be paid in its entirety to one 
dependant or in proportions to some or all of the identified 
dependants; 
 
6.1.1.2 If the Board is unable to identify any dependants after 
conducting a reasonable investigation and the deceased 
member has nominated a person or persons to receive the 
benefit then the benefit must be distributed in accordance with 
the nomination form. However in such an instance if the debts 
of the deceased’s estate exceeds the assets then so much of 
the benefit as is equal to the difference between the assets 
and liabilities must be paid into the deceased’s estate and the 
balance must be paid to the nominees in the proportions 
recorded in the nomination form; 
 
6.1.1.3 If the Board identifies the dependants and the deceased has 
completed a nomination form which records persons other than 
his or her dependants as nominees then the Board must 
distribute the benefit between the identified dependants and 
the nominees in a manner which the Board deems equitable;  
 
6.1.1.4 If the Board is unable to identify any dependants and there are 
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no nominees then the Board must make payment of the benefit 
to the deceased member’s estate or if no such estate exists, 
into the Guardians Fund,79 and 
 
6.1.1.5 If the Board is only able to identify nominees and the entire 
benefit available for distribution is not allocated to such 
nominees by the deceased member then the Board must make 
payment of the remaining benefit to the deceased member’s 
estate or if no such estate exists, into the Guardians Fund. 
 
6.1.2 For purposes of this dissertation only section 37C(1) in so far as it 
places an obligation on the Board to effect an equitable distribution will 
be considered. To the extent that the Board is not required to exercise 
its discretion when allocating the benefit, section 37C(1) expressly 
provides for the manner in which the benefit must be distributed and 
the Board is obliged to make the distribution accordingly. Thus, only 
the allocation of a benefit where the Board has identified only 
dependants or both nominees and dependants and is required to 
exercise its discretion and make an equitable allocation will be 
considered.  
 
6.1.3 Section 37C requires a Board, in express circumstances, after 
identifying the beneficiaries to then effect an equitable distribution 
amongst the identified circle of beneficiaries. It is evident from the 
requirement that the Board exercise a discretion that this aspect of a 
Board’s section 37C obligations is the one which is the most likely to 
be fraught with difficulty and potential risk to the Board and the fund.  
 
6.1.4 The determination of who qualifies as a dependant poses less risk to 
the fund and the Board as the Act expressly records the requirements 
of legal dependency while factual dependency should be evident from 
the investigation, all that the Board is tasked to do is investigate and 
determine whether such persons exist. The Adjudicator over the years 
has also issued enough determinations to give a Board sufficient 
guidelines on which persons are potentially part of the circle of 
                                                          
79 Established by section 91 of the Administration of Estates Act 24 of 1913. 
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beneficiaries.  The main issue which arises in the context of identifying 
a deceased’s beneficiaries is ensuring that a reasonable process has 
been adopted within a reasonable time frame and such an issue 
appears to be far less complicated than the issues which arise when 
exercising the far reaching discretion associated with determining an 
equitable distribution.  
 
6.2 Exercise of discretion by the Board  
 
6.2.1 Where assets are governed by a last will and testament or the law of 
intestate succession, it is very clear to the heirs that the ultimate 
benefit which they receive is outside the control of the executor or 
themselves. A distribution of the deceased estate is outside of the 
control of the executor or any other person and has no discretionary 
element which could be challenged on the basis of the manner in 
which the discretion was exercised. In a section 37C distribution 
however the actual allocation of the benefit is not predetermined by 
the section. The section only regulates it to the extent that it requires a 
Board to make an equitable distribution. The making of such a 
distribution is dependent solely upon the exercise of a discretionary 
power wielded by the Board. 
 
6.2.2 The Board is thus tasked with considering the circle of beneficiaries 
and making what it considers to be an equitable distribution, that is, 
there is no objective criteria contained in section 37C which indicates 
what a Board would need to do to achieve an equitable distribution. 
The only guidance which is contained in the Act is that the Board 
when making a distribution must comply with sections 7C and 7D of 
the Act.  
 
6.2.3 I have in the course of giving legal opinions to Boards regarding death 
benefit distributions observed the subjectivity of the section 37C 
process. It is not unusual for the preliminary decision of a Board to be 
changed when new trustees are appointed or for a decision to be 
swayed by irrelevant factors which the Board considers to be 
appropriate. It is evident from the number of Adjudicator 
determinations and case law that the actual allocation of the benefit 
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results in numerous complaints being lodged against Boards. It is also 
evident from the determinations that often a distribution which a Board 
considers to be equitable does not satisfy the Adjudicator’s concept of 
equitable.80 Further the determinations are evidence that different 
Boards which are called upon to make distributions where the facts 
are similar will allocate the benefit very differently.81 
 
6.3 Conflicts of interest  
 
6.3.1 Section 7C(2)(c) of the Act expressly requires the Board and its 
individual trustees to avoid conflicts of interests. A conflict of interest is 
not a conflict which arises only where a trustee has a financial interest 
in a matter which is serving before the Board. Such a view is not 
correct. A conflict of interest is anything which would cause a trustee 
to have a bias when considering a particular matter in his or her 
capacity as a Board member. Accordingly, for instance, if a trustee 
has a negative bias against second wives as a result of his or her own 
family situation, such a bias would, need to be disclosed to the rest of 
the Board. The other members of the Board would then need to 
decide whether the disclosed information could cause the benefit to be 
allocated in a manner which is not equitable or whether it can be 
discarded as irrelevant to the deliberations at hand. Requiring trustees 
to make such personal disclosures is a very far reaching requirement 
and one which trustees are not usually aware of at the time of 
appointment. Disclosing to the Board a potential financial conflict 
appears to be easier than disclosing a personal conflict of interest. 
Accordingly in many instances although Board members feel strongly 
about a certain aspect of the distribution which may cause them to be 
blinded to all other aspects, no disclosure is forthcoming. It is likely 
that where a perception of bias can be evidenced by a complainant 
who alleges an inequitable distribution arising from such a bias and 
such a conflict was not disclosed, there is a possibility that that 
member of the Board could be determined to have been acting in 
contravention of his duties and be sued in his or her personal capacity 
                                                          
80 Williams v FFE Minerals South Africa Pension Fund and Another [2001] 2BPLR 1678 (PFA) at 
paragraphs 21 and 22. 
81 Mokoena v Metal Industries Provident Fund 2003 (3) BPLR 4481 at paragraph 17.  
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for any loss suffered by the fund as a result of the decision which lead 
to the complaint.82 
 
6.3.2 Trustees need to, in the course of receiving training on section 37C, 
be advised that such disclosures of potential conflicts of interests are 
required and must be made. Once all the disclosures are made, the 
remainder of the Board can determine whether such disclosures are 
relevant or not. Disclosures of conflict of interest will serve not only to 
protect the individual trustees but also the fund.  
 
6.4 Guidelines to achieve an equitable distribution  
 
6.4.1 The Act does not define “equitable” nor does it provide any guidelines 
on how to make an equitable distribution. The Adjudicator has 
however, over the years, given determinations which give Boards 
guidelines on what it should consider in an effort to achieve an 
equitable distribution. The duties of the Board in this regard were 
cogently summarised in Sithole v ICS Provident Fund and Another83, 
as follows: 
 
“When making an equitable distribution amongst dependants the 
board of management has to consider the following factors: 
 
• the age of the dependants; 
 
• the relationship with the deceased; 
 
• the extent of dependency; 
 
• the wishes of the deceased placed either in the nomination and/or 
his last will; and 
 
• financial affairs of the dependants including their future earning 
capacity potential. 
 
                                                          
82 Dollman v Irvin and Johnson Retirement Fund (2008) JOL 22727 at paragraph 3.  
83 Sithole v ICS Provident Fund and Another [2000] 4 BPLR 430 (PFA) at paragraphs  24 and 25. 
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In making their decision, trustees need to consider all relevant 
information and ignore irrelevant facts. Further, trustees must not 
rigidly adhere to a policy or fetter their discretion in any way.” 
 
6.4.2 It is evident from these guidelines that the investigations stage of the 
distribution does not stop once a Board has identified the circle of 
potential beneficiaries but must extend to the determination of the 
equitable distribution.  A view which has on numerous occasions been 
borne out in decisions of the Adjudicator, a Board cannot contemplate 
making an equitable distribution without also giving consideration to 
the intention of the Legislature, that is, how likely is it that a dependant 
will become a burden on the State if he or she does not receive a 
portion of the benefit. 
 
6.4.3 In order to be able to give due consideration to the guidelines provided 
by the Adjudicator, a Board must investigate each of the guidelines in 
so far as they apply to each beneficiary and satisfy itself that it has all 
the information necessary to give meaning to the guidelines. For 
instance when considering the financial circumstances of each 
beneficiary a Board needs to ensure that they have given the identified 
beneficiaries an opportunity to make representations regarding their 
financial situation. A Board must also ensure, as far as possible, that 
the information provided is evidenced and not based on hearsay or 
outdated data.84 The investigation must consider the current financial 
status of each beneficiary, that is, not the financial status which 
existed at the time of death and their potential earning capacity.85 It is 
evident from numerous determinations of the Adjudicator that a Board 
has a duty to ensure that it gives each beneficiary an opportunity to 
furnish it with information which is relevant to determining an equitable 
distribution.  
 
6.4.4 Notwithstanding the existence of guidelines such guidelines are not a 
closed list. A Board cannot use the guidelines which have evolved as 
the only relevant factors which it will consider when determining an 
                                                          





allocation as to do so would result in a fettering of its discretion. It is 
possible for a Board to discard each of the guidelines as being 
irrelevant but then the Board would need to adopt guidelines which it 
believes are of more relevance in a particular situation. It is important 
that Boards remember that they exercise discretion and as such they 
cannot be bound by the criteria set out by the Adjudicator however 
given that the criteria takes into account considerations which appear 
aimed at satisfying the intention of the Legislature and which appear to 
contain factors which should be considered in every distribution, it may 
be prudent for Boards to adopt the criteria as its minimum 
considerations which can be amended as dictated by the 
circumstances of a particular distribution.  
 
6.4.5 In the Mashego86 determination the Adjudicator held that the trustees’ 
decision with regard to the manner in which a death benefit should be 
distributed must be set aside. The Adjudicator was of the view that the 
trustees had failed to consider relevant factors such as the ages of the 
dependants, the financial status of the dependants and the extent of 
dependency of the dependants on the deceased and so on. From the 
facts of the complaint in Mashego it transpired that the trustees 
elected to distribute the benefit exactly as suggested by the 
deceased's spouse. Their discretion was therefore fettered and the 
exercise of such a fettered discretion was potentially prejudicial to the 
deceased's other dependants including the minor child. 
 
6.4.6 Many Boards have taken the view, that an equitable distribution can 
only be achieved if the benefit available for distribution is apportioned 
in some manner amongst the identified beneficiaries. This is not 
correct as an equitable distribution can be achieved even where an 
identified dependant does not receive any portion of the death 
benefit.87 Of course where no dependants have been identified the 
Board has no duty other than to make payment as recorded in the 
nomination form, in which case the Board does not usually exercise a 
discretion as the deceased member would have apportioned the 
                                                          
86 Supra at footnote 42 at paragraph 5.5.5.  
87 Roos v Central Retirement Annuity Fund (PFA/FS15629/07/KM). 
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benefit amongst his or her nominees. 
 
6.5 Managing beneficiary expectations 
 
6.5.1 The unique nature of the South African landscape usually results in 
the distribution of the death benefit being a very emotional exercise.  
Identified dependants, especially in situations where the member has 
been married more than once or was involved in extramarital affairs, 
have expectations which are not usually met by the Board and which 
do not conform with the provisions of section 37C. For instance the 
spouse of the deceased will usually make representations that the 
person with whom the deceased was conducting an extra marital affair 
should not benefit because the relationship was immoral. People find it 
hard to believe that regardless of their relationship with the deceased 
or their status in law that they are on equal footing with other persons 
in the sense that each of them has a possibility of receiving a benefit. 
Each dependant believes that he or she has a greater entitlement to 
the benefit and expects to receive the greatest share. When the 
distribution is made, dependants are often very unhappy and take the 
view that proper consideration was not given to their circumstances, 
that the distribution was not equitable and that the Board did not acquit 
itself in terms of the requirements of the section.  
 
6.5.2 Boards should be wary of becoming involved in the emotional issues 
which may exist between dependants and must not take such 
emotions into consideration when effecting a distribution.88  Many, if 
not the largest percentage of complaints to the Adjudicator, revolve 
around the actual distribution of the benefit to the identified 
beneficiaries.89 Often the complaints are without merit but it is obvious 
                                                          
88 Khulu v LifeCare Group and Others (PFA/GA/8012/2006/SM), the Adjudicator stated the 
following:“The board failed to investigate the financial affairs of the first respondent including her 
future earning capacity as compared to the complainant who is not financially independent and was a 
minor at the time of the deceased’s death. It is clear that the Board allowed the family problems and 
the bad relationship between the deceased and the complainant to overshadow their duty to exercise 
their discretion properly and equitably.” 
89 As far as is evident from the Annual Reports of the Adjudicator the complaints received in respect of 
section 37C are not categorized further and so no information is readily available as to how many of 
the complaints deal with the equity of a distribution. The Adjudicator’s office, when contacted, advised 
that they do not keep statistics which indicate the number of complaints received in respect of the 
individual obligations provided for by section 37C. From my reading of the determinations it appears 
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from the determinations that the complainant was never given any 
reasons as to why the Board considered the distribution to be 
equitable or an opportunity to make representations to the Board as to 
why the Board’s decision was not equitable. 
 
6.5.3 A basic step which could be adopted by Boards and one which would 
be considered prudent is for a Board to advise beneficiaries of the 
basic reason for the allocation and give them an opportunity to make 
representations. Such a process would likely result in fewer 
complaints around this issue being lodged with the Adjudicator. In fact 
the Adjudicator has stated unequivocally that if trustees took their 
roles seriously and understood the responsibility to members and 
attempted to resolve complaints properly there would be fewer 
complaints for the Adjudicator to deal with.90 Nothing in section 37C 
prevents a Board from making a preliminary decision, sharing such a 
decision with the beneficiaries, giving them a specific period within 
which to make representations and then making their final distribution.  
 
6.6 Use of an administrator  
 
6.6.1 As was considered in the discussion of the investigation of 
dependants, the investigation is usually conducted by the 
administrator, who presents its findings for consideration by the Board.  
The investigation usually also entails an investigation of the criteria set 
out by the Adjudicator for consideration by a Board when determining 
the allocation of a benefit. The information is then provided to the 
Board. The Board cannot simply accept the findings of the 
administrator but should ensure that it has procedures in place which 
allow it to test the information provided. The Board must satisfy itself 
that all the relevant criteria which it needs to consider in order to make 
an equitable distribution have been investigated fully and that the 
information which it has is sufficient.  
 
6.6.2 There have been instances where Boards have been provided with 
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information intended to assist it with making an equitable distribution, 
the information has been relied upon by the Board and has formed the 
basis upon which the allocation is based. Subsequently when the 
matter goes before a tribunal it becomes evident that the factual 
information provided by the administrator was incorrect and never 
tested or challenged by the Board.91 As the Board has the duty to 
make an equitable distribution the Board should never accept the 
information provided by the administrator as being correct. Further, 
section 7D(b) of the Act requires a Board to put in place proper control 
systems which systems must contemplate ensuring control over the 
information gathering process undertaken by the administrator to 
assist the Board in determining an equitable distribution of the death 
benefit. The Board should also never rubber stamp an allocation 
proposed by its administrator without applying its mind to the proposed 
distribution and considering whether the proposed distribution would 
be considered to be a proper exercise of its discretion. Once again the 
duty of the Board to protect its members and beneficiaries interests is 
important. In terms of section 7C(b) of the Act a Board must act with 
due care and diligence, it is probable that this object of the Board will 
only be satisfied where the Board applies its mind to all the facts 
before it and then based on those facts makes a distribution which it 
considers to be equitable and which would be viewed by any other 
reasonable Board as being so. 
 
6.7 Interim payments  
 
6.7.1 To the extent that a Board does adopt a process which allows it to 
make interim payments of the benefit to identified beneficiaries then a 
Board cannot consider the value of the interim payments when 
determining what the final allocation will be to that beneficiary. Such a 
consideration would be a fettering of the Board’s discretion and would 
not necessarily result in an equitable distribution. A Board should also 
not allocate an amount to a beneficiary to whom it would otherwise 
allocate a nil value, simply because that person has received an 
interim payment. If the Board has made such interim payments and at 
                                                          
91 Supra at footnotes 2 and 3. 
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the date of the final distribution the beneficiary gets a nil value or less 
than what was allocated by way of interim payments, then the Board 
may be liable in their personal capacity for the loss suffered by the 
fund. Accordingly, it is imperative that Boards which adopt an interim 
distribution protocol ensure that the protocol contains risk mitigation 
mechanisms such as agreements which regulate the position in 
respect of overpayments to beneficiaries. 
 
6.8 Conclusion  
 
6.8.1 It appears from the decisions of the Adjudicator that the Board would 
satisfy its obligation to effect an equitable distribution if the evidence 
upon which it based its decision can withstand scrutiny and if the 
decision were to be considered by another Board the outcome is likely 
to be the same or a wholly similar distribution of the benefit. In 
Carvalho v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund & Others92 the 
Adjudicator expressly indicated that “in reviewing a decision of the 
Board, the role of the Adjudicator is not to determine what the wisest, 
or fairest or most generous distribution would have been, or what 
distribution he/she would have preferred, but rather, whether the 
Board has properly exercised its discretion in terms of the law. Whilst 
the reviewing tribunal may not necessarily agree with the decision 
taken by a Board, that in itself is not a ground for review.93 It is evident 
that the question of equity or fairness is irrelevant in the context of a 
death benefit distribution and that the fundamental consideration is 
whether the Boards discretion as been exercised correctly. 
Accordingly, it appears that the basis of the Adjudicator’s 
determinations is that a proper exercise of discretion will necessarily 
result in an equitable distribution.  
 
6.8.2 A position which is emerging more and more as being the default 
position is that most Boards take the view that a larger allocation to 
the minor children of a deceased member translates into an equitable 
distribution. Adopting such a default position is not without risk. Boards 
                                                          
92 Carvalho v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund & Others (PFA/WE/7998/06/CN) at paragraph 5.4. 
93 Ditshabe v Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund & Another (2) [2001] 10 BPLR. 2579 (PFA) at 
paragraph 13.  
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should be advised that the allocation of a death benefit; which when 
ultimately tested is considered to be equitable, can only be achieved, if 
the Board considers each case on its own merits, that is, even the 
determination of what is equitable must be made on a case to case 
basis. It is not improbable that the minor children of a deceased 
member should not receive the largest portion of the benefit and that 
such an allocation would be determined to be inequitable by a tribunal 
called upon the adjudicate a complaint. A specific case could exist 
which ”requires” a Board to make the larger portion of the benefit 
available to the deceased’s wife for instance because she is not 
working and in need of immediate financial assistance or because 
when she becomes older her financial situation is likely to be more 
precarious than that of her children. 
 
6.8.3 The extent of the investigation which must be conducted by a Board 
can never be dictated other than by the circumstances present in each 
distribution. For instance some distributions may require a Board to 
investigate the cause of a member’s death especially where a death 
certificate records the cause of death as being unnatural. At common 
law there is a tenet which provides that ‘de bloedige hand en neemt 
geen erffenis’, that is, he who has caused the unlawful death of 
another is precluded from benefiting financially from such a death. In 
Makhanya v Minister of Finance and Others94 the High Court held that 
the principle could also be applied to benefits conferred by statute. 
Accordingly, the position appears to be that where a deceased was 
murdered by his or her dependant or nominee that person cannot 
receive a portion of the death benefit which is available for distribution. 
Accordingly, it would be prudent for a Board, where the deceased has 
died through unnatural causes, to satisfy itself that none of the 
persons who form the circle of beneficiaries is responsible for the 
member’s death. To the extent that there is a possibility of a 
dependant or nominee being responsible for the death, that is, the 
person is being investigated by the police or criminal charges have 
been laid then the Board should be wary of distributing the benefit or a 
portion of the benefit to such a person. It would be prudent for a Board 
                                                          
94 2001(2) SA 1251 (D) at 1254C. 
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which finds itself in such a situation to consider employing a 
mechanism which does not prejudice the other beneficiaries and 
which will not prejudice the suspected beneficiary should he or she be 
cleared of all suspicion.  
 
6.8.4 The position adopted by most Boards appears to be, where there are 
dependants and nominees, that the Board must ensure the protection 
of dependants over nominees. Accordingly, the usual position is to 
consider the financial needs of the dependants and then if there is any 
portion of the death benefit available after distributing to such 
dependants to make an allocation to nominees. This position is 
unlikely to be held to be incorrect if challenged as the basis of the 
section is to ensure, as far as possible, the financial independence of 
dependants and as long as Boards are able to show a reasonable and 
rational exercise of their discretion.  
 
6.8.5 The fiduciary environment within which the Board operates requires it 
to make an equitable distribution and so a Board needs to ensure that 
it has the necessary checks and balances in place which require it to 
apply its mind to relevant considerations while discarding irrelevant 
ones and to make a decision which is equitable and gives effect to the 
intention of section 37C. It appears from the Adjudicator’s 
determinations however that many Boards do not understand what a 
relevant consideration is within specific circumstances and are failing 






CHAPTER 7:  DETERMINING THE MODE OF PAYMENT 
 
7. Payment  
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
7.1.1 Once a Board has determined the beneficiaries and is satisfied that its 
proposed allocation to the circle of beneficiaries is, in its view 
equitable, the Board must then decide upon the manner in which 
payment will be effected. Section 37C(2) provides that a benefit may 
be paid directly to a beneficiary or to one of three authorised parties, 
that is, a person who is competent and recognised in law to receive 
and manage the benefit for the beneficiary, or to the trustees of a trust 
contemplated in the Trust Property Control Act95 or to a beneficiary 
fund for the benefit of the beneficiary. Section 37C(2) regulates the 
payment of a benefit to a recognised third party for the benefit of a 
beneficiary, Where a Board opts to make payment to an authorised 
third party then that section records that the payment is deemed to be 
payment to the beneficiary and a fund would no longer be liable to that 
beneficiary notwithstanding the fact that the beneficiary did not 
actually receive the benefit directly. 
 
7.1.2 This step of the distribution of the death benefit is also onerous. A 
Board is not at liberty to simply make payment in cash, directly to the 
beneficiary, or to make payment through one of the other recognised 
modes without considering the impact of the chosen mode of payment 
on the beneficiary. The Board is once again required to apply its mind 
when considering what manner of payment is appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case. It is accepted that there are different 
considerations to be applied when the beneficiary is a minor as 
opposed to when the beneficiary is a major. It is evident from the 
determinations of the Adjudicator96 that, although the Act does not 
expressly state that payment must be effected directly to a major, 
                                                          
95 Act 57 of 1988. 




direct payment is the default position unless the Board takes the view 
that there is sufficient reason for it to elect to use a different mode of 
payment.97 The Board needs to adopt a mode which is reasonable 
and appropriate in the given circumstances.98 
 
7.2 Payment to a trust  
 
7.2.1 The first option available to a Board is payment to a trust. If a Board 
has opted not to make a direct payment and is considering placing the 
benefit into a trust then in accordance with section 37(2)(a)(i) only a 
trust which has been nominated by the deceased member, a major 
beneficiary or a person recognised in law or appointed by a court to 
manage the affairs or meet the daily care needs of a beneficiary may 
be used. However, to the extent that such a trust is nominated in 
compliance with section 37(2)(a)(i), the Board is not compelled to 
make payment to such a trust. The Board would have to satisfy itself 
that payment to such a trust would be in the best interests of the 
beneficiary.  
 
7.2.2 It has become evident in recent years, given scandals such as 
Fidentia, where the benefits which were put into trust for the benefit of 
beneficiaries were swindled, that Boards should be very cautious 
when opting to put money in to trust. Even the Adjudicator has 
cautioned that a Board must proceed with the utmost care and 
diligence when considering an investment vehicle, even when 
assessing the perceived security offered by trusts especially on 
consideration of the huge financial loss incurred by the beneficiaries of 
the Living Hands Trust, whose benefits were recklessly and in some 
instances negligently placed with Fidentia Asset Management.99 A 
Board needs to always remember that a decision in respect of the 
investment of funds belonging to beneficiaries is a duty that requires 
the exercise of sober minds, utmost care and diligence by the 
Board.100 
                                                          
97 Ex Parte Oppel and Another 2002 (5) SA 125 (C); Moralo v Holcim South Africa Provident Fund 
(PFA/GA/5400/2005/ZC). 
98 Chitja v Alexander Forbes Financial Services (PFA/GA/8633/2006/SM). 





7.2.3 A Board which opts to place a beneficiary’s benefit into trust would 
need to ensure that there is unlikely to be prejudice which could be 
suffered by a beneficiary and that the trust which it is considering is 
well managed and has a proven track record. Where a Board has not 
properly investigated the trust and does not apply its mind to placing 
the funds in such a vehicle, if the beneficiary does suffer prejudice, it is 
likely that such a beneficiary would have recourse against the fund.  
 
7.3 Payment to a minor  
 
7.3.1 A Board also has the option of making payment to the guardian of a 
minor beneficiary or the person appointed to manage the affairs of a 
major beneficiary. The Adjudicator has on numerous occasions 
reiterated that payment to a minor’s guardian should be the usual 
position adopted by a Board unless cogent reason exists for making 
payment by some other recognised mode.101 Payment to a minor’s 
guardian does not open a Board to much risk. The only time a Board 
would be open to liability is if it were negligent in making the payment 
to a minor’s guardian, that is, the Board did not consider that person’s 
ability to manage the funds or knew or ought reasonably to have 
known that paying the benefit to such a person would not be in the 
best interests of the beneficiary. For instance a Board which makes 
payment to a guardian who has been convicted of fraud would be at 
great risk of being liable for any loss suffered by the beneficiary as a 
result of the guardian’s actions. In such an instance the Board would 
not have exercised its discretion properly as it did not consider all the 
relevant factors necessary for making the decision.  
 
7.3.2 There have been numerous decisions which consider the failure of a 
Board to properly consider the necessary factors before making 
payment of a minor’s benefit to a third party other than the guardian. In 
                                                          
101 Dhlamini v Smith and Another [2003] 7 BPLR 4894 (PFA) at page 4895/ Chitja v Alexander Forbes 
Financial Services (PFA/GA/8633/2006/SM). 
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Malatjie v Idwala Provident Fund102 the Adjudicator set out some of 
the factors which a Board should consider such as the amount of the 
benefit, the ability of the guardian to properly administer the money, 
and the fact that the benefit would need to be employed in such a 
manner that it is provided until the beneficiary attained his or her 
majority. It also appears from the decided cases that the higher the 
amount of benefit, the more onerous the duty on the Board to ensure 
that measures are put in place for the proper care and administration 
of the amount.103 In light of the decisions of the Adjudicator and the 
obligations of the Board to apply its mind, it is evident that the Board 
cannot fetter its discretion by simply adopting a mode of payment 
without considering all the relevant factors. It would be prudent for 
Boards which opt not to make payment to a minor beneficiary’s 
guardian to have evidence which indicates cogent reasons for 
adopting such a resolution. 
 
7.3.3 Section 37C also provides that a Board may pay the benefit which is 
due to a minor in instalments provided that interest accrues from time 
to time. Once again a Board which considers such an option must 
have a good reason, based on evidence, for depriving the minor’s 
guardian of control over the entire benefit. Further, the Board must 
ensure that it has administration processes in place which allow it to 
elect for such an option. A Board which opts to pay a minor’s benefit in 
instalments must ensure that the interest is accruing at the correct rate 
and periods, that the instalments are paid and that the instalment 
arrangement is not so rigid as to prejudice the beneficiary. For 
instance a Board would need to be able to access the benefit should it 
be required for payments relating to the maintenance of the minor. It 
would also be relevant for a Board to consider the cost of such an 
arrangement to the fund and the benefit which such an arrangement 
provides and whether such benefit could not be achieved through a 
beneficiary fund for instance. 
 
7.4 Payment to a person recognised in law 
 
                                                          
102 [2005] 1BPLR 45 (PFA) at paragraph 16. 
103 Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1981 (1) SA 1020 (A) at page 1031. 
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7.4.1 Section 37C also recognises payment to a person recognised in law 
as being responsible for managing the affairs and meeting the daily 
care needs of a beneficiary. This means that there is a possibility that 
a person other than the guardian of a minor could be considered as an 
authorised third party. The Act does not define who such a person is 
and as such reference would need to be made to other legislation 
such as the Children’s Act104 Given that there is no clear reference in 
the Act as to exactly who should be considered as managing and 
meeting the daily care needs of a beneficiary, it is important that a 
Board consider whether a person meets such criteria and has any 
standing in law. If such a person exists, the Board is not compelled to 
effect payment to that person but would need to investigate the 
possibility of such a payment. It may be sufficient for a Board to 
discount payment to such a person in favour of a trust or beneficiary 
fund as the person has no right to administer the finances of the 
beneficiary and further the person may only be providing the required 
care for a short period of time and will not be around to administer the 
finances until for instance a minor beneficiary attains majority. Given 
the risks which attach to opting for such a payment it would be prudent 
for the Board to consider all the options at its disposal ensuring that it 
opts for the mode of payment which is in its view least prejudicial to 
the beneficiary both in the short term and the long term.  
 
7.5 Payment to a curator  
 
7.5.1 Payment of a benefit to a beneficiary’s curator does not pose issues 
as the usual process when appointing curators is that the court 
considers their capabilities to administer finances. It is unlikely that a 
Board will be considered negligent if it makes payment to a curator 
given that a court has appointed such a person, However a Board 
must satisfy itself that the relevant legal requirements have been met 
and that the curator has been duly appointed.  
 
7.6 Payment to a beneficiary fund 
 
                                                          
104 Act 38 of 2005. 
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7.6.1 The last option which a Board has available to it is payment to a 
beneficiary fund which is registered in accordance with the Act. Given 
the prevalence of mismanagement of money within trusts and what 
appears to be regulatory failure to ensure proper controls within trusts, 
the retirement fund industry has taken the view that it may be best for 
a Board to opt to use a beneficiary fund rather than a trust. Once 
again payment to such a vehicle is not a mindless task and requires a 
Board to ensure that it chooses a beneficiary fund which is best for the 
beneficiary.  
 
7.7 Payment to a major beneficiary  
 
7.7.1 Boards have come under fire for taking a paternalistic approach to 
payment of a benefit to major beneficiary who in the view of the Board 
is incapable of managing his or her own affairs. It is clear from the 
provisions of section 37C that a Board does not have carte blanche 
when deciding the mode of payment to a major beneficiary who is not 
prohibited in law from managing his or her own affairs. Regardless of 
whether the Board believes a major beneficiary capable of managing 
the benefit or not, the Board may only pay the benefit to a beneficiary 
fund or in instalments if the beneficiary consents to such mechanisms 
for payment. The Board can also only pay the funds into a trust 
nominated by the major beneficiary. It appears that the Board does not 
have many options other than approaching a court to have a curator 
appointed to manage such major beneficiary’s affairs. Where such a 
course is considered the Board would need to consider whether the 
financial costs associated with obtaining such an order would be 
reasonable, not be more than the benefit itself and cause no prejudice 
to the fund or its members.  
 
7.7.2 A Board may also pay a major beneficiary by way of instalments but 
such an arrangement can only be reached with the consent of that 
beneficiary and must be regulated by agreement between the fund 
and the major beneficiary, which agreement must satisfy the express 
requirements of section 37C(4). Given that such a mode of payment 
can only be reached by agreement, the Board in my view, is only 
exposed to a very small degree of risk, Which risk would arise for 
73 
 
instance if the agreement was reached on a misrepresentation. Once 
again however a Board which considers such an approach must 
ensure that it does not have a financial impact on the fund and its 
members and that the administration system of the fund is able to 
administer the provisions of the agreement. If the control systems 
which the Board has in place are ineffective and the fund does not 
perform in accordance with the agreement then the fund could be at 
risk of being sued for breach of contract which in turn would expose 
the Board to risk and potential claims against the members of the 
Board in their personal capacity. 
 
7.8 Conclusion  
 
7.8.1 Regardless of the mode of payment which the Board opts for, the 
Board would need to be able to substantiate its choice should its 
decision be challenged.  When it comes to the mode of payment most 
of the complaints relate to the reason the Board opted for a mode of 
payment other than direct payment. Accordingly it would be prudent 
where Boards opt for payments other than through what can be 
considered a direct mechanism for the Board to have a cogent reason 
for such a decision and the evidence to substantiate the reasoning 






CHAPTER 8:  OBTAINING EXPERT ADVICE 
 
8. Expert Advice  
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
8.1.1 There is no doubt that satisfying the obligations imposed upon it by 
section 37C is difficult and not without risk to the Board. The Board 
however is not expected to apply section 37C without assistance. 
Section 7(D)(e) of the Act expressly provides that the Board must seek 
expert advice where necessary. It is evident that the advice must be 
provided by an expert on the particular issue which is being 
considered. For instance if the Board is struggling with a legal 
question then the Board must seek out the service of an attorney who 
has expertise in pension law, if the Board is unsure as to whether a 
person is the child of a deceased member then the Board must seek 
out an expert to conduct paternity testing.  
 
8.2 Appointment of experts  
 
8.2.1 A further consideration which a Board must have when appointing an 
expert is whether the expert is independent. The Registrar has clearly 
indicated that the Board should satisfy itself that any expert advice 
obtained is independently given and that where the professional gives 
expert advice in respect of a service provider or the employer or sponsor 
to the fund then the Board should satisfy itself that such advice is not 
compromised by a conflict of interest.105 
 
8.2.2 The Board also has a duty to appoint registered or accredited or 
approved experts.106 Experts are specialists in their field who consider 
each case on its own facts and are able to pronounce and give a 




                                                          
105 Supra at footnote 27 at page 5. . 
106 Ibid at paragraph 39 and 40.  
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8.3 Impact of expert appointment  
 
8.3.1 It has become almost impossible for Boards to function without obtaining 
proper expert advice especially in the areas of the Act which are more 
likely to be prejudicial to the fund and its members such as effecting 
an equitable distribution of a death benefit. It appears that the use of 
experts should be proactive, especially where the potential prejudice is 
great, rather than reactive. It is evident from the determinations of the 
Adjudicator that very often a Board will only seek expert advice where 
a decision is the subject of a dispute. A Board should always be 
aware that it can use an expert’s service and should where necessary 
apply its mind to whether a particular situation warrants such services 
being procured by the Board.  
 
8.3.2 Accordingly, a Board can seek whatever expert advice is necessary to 
ensure that it is complying with its obligations or at least has in place 
operating procedures which are aimed at mitigating the risk of making 
an incorrect distribution. However to the extent that the Board does 
use experts, the Board cannot fetter its discretion by not applying its 
mind to the facts at hand and blindly following the advice or opinion of 
the expert. The Board may use experts to assist with effecting an 
equitable distribution but cannot by using such experts extricate itself 
from having to make a decision or from the consequences which may 
attach to the decision.  
 
8.3.3 For instance in the Jacobz v Altron Group Pension Fund and Others 107 
determination, a complaint which considered a disability benefit claim, 
the Adjudicator held that the trustees failed to apply their own 
mind to the complainant's claim and simply rubberstamped the 
recommendations made by the fund's medical experts. It is clear that 
notwithstanding the use of experts a Board is required to apply its 
mind to the facts of a situation.  
 
8.3.4 There is no doubt that, when considering a death benefit distribution, 
situations may arise which require expert advice. Trustees do not 
                                                          
107 Jacobz v Altron Group Pension Fund and Others (2003) 8 BPLR 5071 (PFA) at paragraph 26. 
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always have the necessary skill, expertise and qualifications which may 
be required to effect a specific distribution which an expert may have. 
The question which then becomes pertinent is how then is a Board 
supposed to apply its mind to the advice or opinion of an expert who is 
far more skilled to make the decision. Boards must apply their minds by 
questioning the expert until they understand the advice given and are in 
a position to accept or reject it. Boards must take cognisance of the fact 
that they can agree with the recommendation of an expert or disagree 
but what is required of them is to consider the recommendations of the 
expert in light of the facts of the situation, ask relevant questions and 
take a view on the recommendation. What a Board cannot do is simply 
rubberstamp the recommendation of an expert without testing and 
considering it.  
 
8.3.5 The position which needs to be followed by a Board when using an 
expert are summarised by the Mouton Committee Report108 and 
requires the Board to consult experts when the Board does not have 
adequate knowledge or skills within the Board to deal with an issue. 
Further, once the expert has responded to the issue, the Board must 
consider the advice and then make a relevant and reasonable decision.109 
 
8.3.6 PF Circular 130 records that the Board is not obliged to have all the 
expert skills necessary for the day to day operation of a fund and it is 
reasonable for the Board to engage relevant experts for advice on 
issues which are the responsibility of the Board.110 Most importantly the 
Board needs to know and understand what they do not know and 
thereafter appoint people who are most capable to assist them. As 
stated above however it remains the Board's duty to deliberate and 
accept those opinions and legal advice that advances the interests of 
the fund and its members and discard those that may cause the exercise 
of their discretion to be categorised as unreasonable and exercised 
without due care and diligence. 
 
8.4 Conclusion  
                                                          
108 Supra at footnote 21. 
109 Supra at footnote 20 at page 108. 




8.4.1 A Board must be aware that it is empowered to appoint an expert and 
must give due consideration to appointing such a person where a 
situations requires such input. However a Board can never opt out of 
its obligations on the basis of such an appointment. Accordingly, a 
Board which appoints an expert, regardless of whether the expert is 
an attorney, medical practitioner or private investigator, is still required 
to apply its minds to the report of the expert and exercise its discretion 
in the correct manner.  
 
8.4.2 Given the risk of a complaint being lodged with the Adjudicator and a 
decision being overturned, it may be prudent for Boards that are 
considering distributions which are not negligible in value to seek 
advice from an expert where it is of the view that the complexities of 
the distribution are such that is very likely to be challenged. This will 
give the Board the benefit of an outside view which may cause it to 
exercise its discretion differently and in a manner which makes any 
challenge less likely to be successful.  
 
8.4.3 The use of experts will no doubt reduce the possibility of a complaint 
being lodged with the Adjudicator if the proper process is followed by 
the Board. However a Board must be awake to the reality which is that 
the expert is merely another tool provided by the Act to assist the 
Board to get the job done correctly. The expert is there to guide the 





CHAPTER 9: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES WHEN A DISTRIBUTION IS 
CHALLENGED 
 
9. Outcomes  
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
9.1.1 The question which now needs to be considered is what is the position 
where a complaint is lodged with the Adjudicator and the distribution of 
a death benefit is determined to be contrary to the provisions of section 
37C? 
 
9.1.2 It is evident from the decisions of the Adjudicator that there is a 
reluctance to alter a decision which has been reached through a 
reasonable exercise of discretion.111 Where a Board has conducted 
itself well then the usual determination of the Adjudicator is to find that 
the Board has acted reasonably and properly. For instance in the 
determination of Coetzee v Central Retirement Annuity Fund112the 
Adjudicator took the view that the Board was empowered with 
discretionary power to decide on an equitable distribution of the death 
benefit and that only in instances where the decision maker has 
exercised its discretionary powers unreasonably and improperly, or has 
unduly fettered its exercise thereof, that the decision of the Board is 
reviewable. 
 
9.1.3 Throughout this dissertation there are references to the risks which may 
attach to the members of the Board. The question which is often posed 
by a Board is what is the risk which the fund will face if a certain 
decision is made, it is very rare for a member of the Board to question 
his or her own liability which may arise from a decision of the Board. 
Very few Boards even understand what recourse there is when a death 
benefit distribution is determined to be incorrect.  
 
                                                          
111 Schleicher and Another v SA Retirement Annuity Fund and Others 2002 (7) BPLR 3677 (PFA) at 
3685 B-D.  
112 Supra at footnote 40 at paragraph 5.7. 
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9.2 Adjudicator’s recourse 
 
9.2.1 The determinations of the Adjudicator adopt the administrative law 
approach of remitting a decision to the initial decision maker unless to 
do so would result in a further failure of justice. Where the distribution 
is referred back to the Board for re-consideration, the Board is 
required to re-exercise its discretion and to take into consideration the 
reasons for the determination. However given that the Board has to 
exercise its discretion taking into consideration factors which it 
considers relevant, a Board which reconsiders a distribution may not 
necessarily make a different distribution to its initial distribution. The 
Adjudicator has also where a distribution is determined to be in 
contravention of section 37C substituted his or her own decision for 
that of the Board.113 
 
9.2.2 In the determination of Gowing v Lifestyle Retirement Fund114 a 
question that lay before the Adjudicator was the respondent's 
argument that given that an investigation had taken place and 
dependants identified, there was a no longer a need to consider 
claims by nominees. In considering whether the matter needed to be 
remitted back to the Board in order for them to re-exercise their 
discretion the Adjudicator considered the general principle applied by 
the courts.115 The courts will not readily assume discretion which has 
been entrusted to another tribunal or functionary, and will refer the 
matter back to that tribunal or functionary for a new decision. This 
general principle is only departed from in exceptional circumstances, 
where for instance the end result is a foregone conclusion, and it 
would merely be a waste of time to order the tribunal or functionary to 
reconsider the matter; further delay would cause unjustifiable 
prejudice to the applicant; the tribunal or functionary has exhibited bias 
or incompetence to such a degree that it would be unfair to require the 
applicant to submit to the same jurisdiction again; the court is in a good 
position to make the decision itself.116 
 
                                                          
113 Moir v Reef Group Pension Plan and Others [2000] 6 BPLR 629 (PFA) at page 640. 
114 Supra at footnote 7 at paragraph 5.3. 
115 Supra at footnote 7 at paragraph 9.1 
116 Supra at footnote 7 at paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2. 
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9.2.3 In Gowing117 the Adjudicator held that justice would not be served by 
remitting the matter back to the Board.118 The Adjudicator stated that 
the Board had done little to properly investigate the matter and there 
was “nothing to suggest that a reconsideration of the matter 
would be undertaken more comprehensively, or that there would be a 
consideration of the relevant factors.”119 The Adjudicator considers an 
important factor to be the length of time it has taken to finalise a 
distribution.120 The Adjudicator took the view that due to the further delay 
that would be caused by remitting the matter which had already been 
pending for more than three years, it was best for the Adjudicator to 
determine the matter using the information before her. 
 
9.2.4 One of the risks a Board faces when a decision is challenged is that the 
Adjudicator will substitute his or her own decision for that of the Board. 
Given that the usual process for determining a complaint is that the 
Adjudicator considers the written submissions of the parties, a Board 
must ensure that its response to a complaint is comprehensive and 
provides all the relevant information to the Adjudicator, so that in the 
event of its decision being substituted, the decision of the Adjudicator 
will at least take into consideration that which was considered by the 
Board. Accordingly, where a death benefit distribution is challenged, a 
Board must ensure that it does respond and that the response is 
comprehensive and has its basis in the Act and the rules of the fund 
and provides the evidence which informed the decision.  
 
9.3 Consequences for Board members  
 
9.3.1 In certain instances a fund will suffer financial prejudice as a result of a 
distribution being found to be deficient. A fund is a separate entity from 
its Board and the individual members of that Board. A fund is capable of 
suing and being sued. In most instances an aggrieved person will sue 
the fund for any loss suffered, if the fund suffers financial prejudice 
because of the negligence of trustees then the fund has a right of 
                                                          
117 Supra at footnote 7 at paragraph 9.4. 
118 Supra at footnote 7 at paragraph 9.4. 
119 Supra at footnote 7 at paragraph 9.2.  
120 Supra at footnote 7 at paragraph 9.3. 
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recourse against the relevant trustee for the financial loss suffered 
which would include any legal costs associated with defending the 
claim. Due to the fiduciary relationship which exists even a member or 
beneficiary could initiate an action directly against a trustee in his or her 
personal capacity. The ever growing view is that trustees have a strict 
duty to distribute the trust property to the right person and further that 
under normal circumstances trustees must be held strictly liable if they 
fail to distribute the trust property to the right person.121 
 
9.3.2 There are rules which record that the fund will indemnify the trustees 
against any loss arising from their negligence. Given that a Board has 
an obligation to act in the best interests of its members having such an 
indemnity is unlikely to be considered to be for the best interests of the 
members as it seeks to protect the Board at the expense of the fund 
and its membership. In an instance were such an indemnity exists, a 
fund would have no recourse against the individual trustees for any 
financial loss suffered as a result of the Board’s actions. For purposes 
of this dissertation I will only consider the liability of the Board in the 
absence of an indemnity which operates in the Board’s favour.  
 
9.3.3 In limited circumstances and obviously depending on the facts of each 
case, the Adjudicator has taken a robust approach whereby 
trustees have been held personally liable for benefits. In the Mes122 
determination the Adjudicator held that the third respondent being a 
trustee of the board of that fund was personally liable to 
compensate the complainant for the financial loss she suffered 
because of his failure to exercise his duties with proper care and 
diligence, to ensure that contributions were forwarded to Liberty Life 
timeously to avoid the lapsing of the underlying policy resulting in 
the complainant's claim for an insured benefit being repudiated by 
Liberty Life.123 The errant trustee subsequently appealed the decision of 
the Adjudicator124 and the appeal was dismissed with costs. As at June 
2008 the errant trustee was liable in his personal capacity for an amount 
                                                          
121 Supra at footnote 120.  
122 Mes v Art Medical Equipment-PFA/GA/1198/00/LS at paragraph 29.  
123 Ibid at paragraph 28.  
124 Witwatersrand Local Division case number 06/13614 (HC), unreported. 
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of R2 575 706, 62. It is evident from the Mes case that the exposure 
which a trustee could face can be very substantial and detrimental to 
the finances of the trustee.  
 
9.3.4 Our courts have even ruled that the Board pay the litigation costs of a 
beneficiary de bonis propriis125 on an attorney and client scale. In 
Seymour-Smith v Maxam Dantex South Africa (Pty) Limited and 
Others126 the court held that the Board had acted errantly and with 
gross negligence and ordered the members of the Board to pay the 
costs de bonis propriis jointly and severally.  
 
9.3.5 Funds usually have fidelity and professional indemnity cover in place 
which protects the fund in the event of trustee negligence. Where a 
Board makes a distribution and is subsequently advised that its decision 
will be challenged then the Board must advise its insurer of the possible 
claim as soon as possible as most policies of insurance provide that 
notice must be given as soon as the fund or Board has reason to believe 
that a claim will be made. Insurers who do not receive notice of a claim 
as provided for in the policy document are entitled to repudiate such a 
claim. Where such repudiation occurs and the fund is out of pocket, the 
fund or its members could initiate a claim against the individual members 
of the Board in their personal capacity.  
 
9.3.6 Where a Board or its individual members give the Registrar reason to 
believe that the Board member is not fit and proper to hold office, then in 
terms of section 26(4) of the Act, the Registrar may, after giving the 
Board member a reasonable opportunity to be heard, direct the Board 
member to vacate office. It is very unlikely that the Registrar will invoke 
such a power where a Board gets a few distributions incorrect but I have 
no doubt where a Board shows a lack of knowledge time and time again 
when making a distribution of a death benefit that the Registrar will have 
cause to have the Board members removed from office.  
 
9.3.7 The Act however does not provide a specific penalty for non-
                                                          
125 This is a type of cost order which a court may grant against a party to litigation where the party has 
acted in bad faith and unreasonably especially where the matter could have been resolved by means 
other than litigation.  
126 2008 JDR 0362 (W). 
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compliance with section 7C and D.  Thus when it comes to a failure of a 
Board to act in accordance with its statutory duties consideration must be 
given to the recourse available at common law or within other statutes. 
The recourse at common law Penalties imposed by common law 
vary from the return of profits made as at result of improper conduct to 
being liable in one's personal capacity for any loss or damage caused by 
such conduct.127 Further recourse available against errant trustees exists 
within other statutory regimes such as the Financial Institutions 
(Protection of Funds Act),128 a penalty or up to 15 years' 
imprisonment can be imposed on a trustee if guilty of a criminal 
offence129.  
 
9.4 Conclusion  
 
9.4.1 There is no doubt that serving as a trustee on a Board is not without risk, 
however a Board which does not obtain adequate training and an 
understanding of what section 37C requires of it, will be exposing itself to 
even greater risk of liability. Given that trustees may be held to be liable 
in their personal capacity for the actions of the Board or for their 
individual actions, Boards must ensure that they actively seek to be 
educated and that they are fit and proper to undertake the role. 
Accordingly, given that it serves not just the interest of a fund and its 
members but also the interest of the individuals on the Board, a Board 
must actively ensure not just training but also the implementation of 
processes which seek to provide them with a practical guide through 





                                                          
127 See supra at footnote 20 at page 109. 
128 Act 28 of 2001. 
129 Ibid at section 10. 
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CHAPTER 10: THE POSITION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
10. United Kingdom  
 
10.1 Introduction  
 
10.1.1 The South African trust law regime has its basis in the trust law system 
of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, it is very relevant, in the context of 
this paper to consider the extent of the duties of trustees who sit on the 
boards of funds in the United Kingdom. It appears that the 
responsibilities of the English trustees are divided into three categories: 
duties, powers and discretionary powers. The general requirements to 
be met by English trustees appear to be very similar to the fiduciary 
requirements which need to be met by South African Boards.  
 
10.1.2 Given that this dissertation is focussed on section 37C which 
empowers Boards with a wide discretion, it is relevant to consider the 
manner in which the discretionary powers of English trustees is 
required to be exercised. English pension law requires discretionary 
powers to be exercised in a reasonable manner and it is accepted that 
a capricious or irrational decision is likely to be challenged.130 The 
requirement of English trustees is that they consider the circumstances 
very carefully before making a decision. This requirement is mirrored 
by the responsibility of South African Boards as discussed earlier. 
 
10.2 Guidance provided to English trustees 
 
10.2.1 English trustees are assisted in meeting their duty by rules which are 
known as the Wednesbury Principles and it is accepted that a Board 
which follows those rules is unlikely to have a decision overturned. The 
Wednesbury Principles require a Board to ask themselves the correct 
questions; direct themselves correctly in law, not to arrive at a perverse 
decision, that is, a decision which no reasonable Board could arrive at 
and to consider all relevant factors while discarding irrelevant ones. 
The manner in which an English Board is required to exercise its 
                                                          
130 Edge v Pensions Ombudsman (CA) (1999) OPLR 179 
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discretion appears to mirror the requirements which need to be met by 
a South African Board which is called upon to exercise its discretion. 
Further as in South African law, the English position is that in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that the 
trustees have exercised their discretion properly.131 It could also be 
concluded from the decisions of the Adjudicator, although not 
expressed, that the guidelines which appear in many decisions have 
their roots in the Wednesbury Principles. The position in English 
pension law, given the objects of this dissertation, are even more 
relevant because in the event of a death in service lump sum benefit 
having to be paid the board of a fund is required to exercise discretion.  
 
10.2.2 Distribution of a death benefit by English trustees 
 
10.2.3 A death benefit must be paid to dependants otherwise tax 
consequences arise. Dependant, as in South Africa, has a statutory 
definition which includes the members spouse or civil partner, anyone 
who is dependent on the member by reason of physical or mental 
disability, anyone who is financially dependent or financially 
interdependent on the member and the members children (up to age 23 
years regardless of whether such a child is financially dependent on the 
member or not or still to be educated). The rules of an English pension 
fund may however place further limitations on the identified group but 
cannot extend it.  
 
10.2.4 Where a death in service lump sum is payable English trustees are 
called upon to exercise their discretion to decide who receives the 
benefit. On first glance this duty appears to be identical to that of its 
South African counterparts and so it would stands to reason that 
English trustees must be faced with the same difficulties. 
 
10.2.5 The practice which is followed by most English Boards is to encourage 
a member on joining a pension arrangement which provides lump sum 
death benefits to complete an expression of wish declaration form. It is 
immediately apparent that the form is not called a nomination form and 
                                                          
131 Wilson v The Law Debenture Trust Corporation (1995) OPLR 103 
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which very name suggests that such a form on completion is binding on 
a Board. It may be prudent for South African Boards to follow such a 
model and make it clear that the form which is completed by a fund 
member is merely a form which is used to advise the Board of his or her 
wishes but does not bind the Board. A further mechanism employed by 
English Boards, which has merit, is the recordal of a members wishes 
on his or her benefit statement each year. This is used as a method to 
prompt members to revise their declarations if circumstances have 
changed. It may be prudent for South African Boards to consider 
adopting such a mechanism as it would increases the chances of a 
Board having a member’s most updated wish at the time of his or her 
death.  
 
10.2.6 In keeping with section 37C, the board of an English fund is not bound 
by the completed declaration and such a declaration only serves to 
record a member’s wish.  The considerations which must be taken into 
account by an English Board when considering how the benefit should 
be split are very similar to those which have been enunciated by the 
Adjudicator. The Board is called upon to consider the financial 
circumstances of a deceased member’s legal and factual dependants 
and those people recorded in the expression of wish. The Board is 
called upon to exercise its discretion and make a reasonable 
distribution. Although the position appears to be exactly the same as 
provided for by section 37C, in English law the discretion which 
attaches to the distribution of the lump sum benefit can be narrowed 
through the rules of the fund. For instance the rule can provide that the 
benefit may be split up between identified persons.  
 
10.2.7 Given that the position is regulated by Her Majesties Revenue and 
Customs and not the actual legislation which governs pension law, very 
little direction is given other than to state that the lump sum may be paid 
to the employee’s legal representatives or a nominated beneficiary or 
distributed at the discretion of the trustees/administrator and it is not 
necessary to limit nomination or distribution to dependants.  
 




10.3.1 English pension law has taken the route which is less risky as it allows 
discretion to be exercised but it also provides that such discretion may 
be constrained by the provisions of the rules of a particular fund. 
Accordingly, the rules of a fund can prescribe the parameters within 
which discretion is to be exercised which in turn provides guidance to 
trustees and decreases the fund’s exposure to financial loss arising 
from a decision of its board. In South Africa a death benefit can only be 
distributed in accordance with section 37C which means that the rules 
cannot be used to mitigate the risk of the fund. 
 
10.3.2 A further important deviation between the English position and South 
Africa’s is that English Boards can make payment to a deceased 
member’s estate. Given that deceased estates are structured to meet 
the wishes of the deceased or in the event of no will existing ensuring 
the protection of the closest successors of the deceased, payment to 
such an estate may seem to be the obvious choice however payment to 
the estate attracts inheritance tax while payment to an individual does 
not attract tax. It appears that the English model is also structured to 
give a board motivation to find the dependants of the deceased member 
and to apply its mind so that the benefit is distributed in a reasonable 
manner based on relevant considerations.  
 
10.3.3 It is evident on comparing the English position with the South African 
position that the discretion which attaches to the payment of lump sum 
death benefits is treated very similarly. It is also evident that the Boards 
in both jurisdictions are tasked with onerous obligations but that the task 
of a South Africa Board is more difficult as it cannot narrow its discretion 
through its rules. 
 
10.4 Conclusion  
 
10.4.1 Other than the commentary on how the discretion is to be applied there 
is no real discussion in an English context on how the Board can ensure 
that it has fewer referrals to the Pensions Ombudsman.132 This could be 
                                                          
132 The Pensions Ombudsman was established with effect from April 1991 by Act of the United 
Kingdom Parliament. The statutory powers and provisions governing the ombudsman appear in 
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because English Boards apply the Wednesbury Principles or because 
trust law, in general, is a well understood concept which individual 
board members are well versed in. The other prominent feature of 
English pension law is that it has placed greater emphasis on trustee 
training in light of numerous pension scandals in the industry. The 
retirement funding industry in England also provides trustee training 
which is examinable and which covers a wide range of topics with focus 
on those areas which are especially problematic. Trustees are required 
in terms of the Pensions Act 2004 to maintain a level of trustee 
knowledge and understanding which includes knowledge of pension 
legislation as well as the key documents of their plan. 
 
10.4.2 In the 2009 and 2010 financial year, 48 of the 889 complaints 
determined by the Pensions Ombudsman related to spouses and 
dependants benefits. I have assumed that this includes death benefit 
lump sum complaints as the annual report does not even have such 
complaints as a separate line item.133 In the same year there were 3947 
enquiries but only 950 of those were accepted for investigation. The 
Adjudicator’s Office during the same financial year134 reported receipt of 
6188 complaints of which 8% (about 495 complaints) were in respect of 
distribution of death benefits. This is more than half of the total 
complaints which were investigated by the Pensions Ombudsman 
during the same period,  
 
10.4.3 Given the very limited extent of the statutory provisions which regulate 
the payment of death in service lump sum benefits it is highly probable 
that there is greater scope for error in distributing a death benefit in the 
English pension funding environment. For instance Boards are not 
even given guidance as to the manner in which the benefit is to paid. 
However even with the greater scope for error than that which South 
African Board’s face, there are very few referrals to the Pensions 
Ombudsman regarding the distributions of death in service lump 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sections 145-152 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (as amended) which make up Part X of that Act. 
They are supplemented by Regulations. 
133 Annual Report and Accounts 2009/2010, Pensions Ombudsman, www.pensions-
ombudsman.org.uk, last visited 29 February 2012. 
134 Annual Report 2009/2010, Pension Fund Adjudicator, www.pfa.org.za/publications last visited on 
29 February 2012. 
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sums. It can be persuasively concluded that the limited extent of 
referrals to tribunals is evidence that Boards which are given sufficient 
training and a clear understanding of their duties as well as guiding 
principles, will like their English counterparts meet their obligation 
more often than not, resulting in fewer referrals to the Adjudicator. This 
is substantiated by the critical concerns raised by the Adjudicator one 
of which is that manner in which trustee exercise discretion is a 
problem as they appear to ignore their fundamental mandate which is 
to ignore irrelevant facts and mainly take into account relevant 
ones.135 
  
                                                          
135 Critical issues facing OPFA with specific reference to the provisions of the Pension Funds 




CHAPTER 11:  RECOMMENDATIONS  
 




11.1.1 In an address to the National Assembly during a debate on Budget 
dated 24 May 2007, Mr J Moleketi, the then Deputy Minister of Finance 
stated that there was clearly a failure of proper governance on the 
part of Boards in exercising their fiduciary duties, especially in 
respect of the distribution of death benefits. The remedies for the 
consequences of poor governance which were advanced by him 
were litigation against errant Boards who have caused prejudice 
to beneficiaries and promoting collective action in cases where 
widows and orphans have been left destitute by the actions of a handful 
of unscrupulous Board members who failed to execute their fiduciary 
duties in a responsible manner.136 Mr Moleketi's address was probably 
influenced by the Fidentia Asset Management (Pty) Ltd and the Living 
Hands trust scandal abuse. 
 
11.1.2 In PF Circular 130 the Registrar records that the Board should, at the 
fund’s expense, receive comprehensive training on both the legislative 
and regulatory framework and governance principles in order to 
equip them to effectively carry out their functions as board members, 
and to enable them to minimize their risk of liability as well as to 
safeguard them against bad decision-making.137 The Registrar further 
emphasized that training is an ongoing process and shall educate 
trustees about new matter matters relating to risk management, benefit 
structures, legal issues, compliance requirements and other issue.138 
 
11.1.3 There has always been concern in the pension fund industry because 
                                                          
136 Address to the National Assembly during the debate on Budget Vote 8 – National Treasury 
(including South African Revenue Service (SARS) and Budget Vote 13 – Statistics South Africa) by Mr 
J Moleketi (MP), Deputy Minister of Finance – www.gov.za – last visited 30 September 2011. 




the Act does not require trustees to be fit and proper.139 The 
advantages to having a Board with the necessary skill and expertise is 
that the risk of ill considered decisions decreases. The effect of this is 
that trustees are not required to meet any specific standard and as 
such any person may occupy the position of a trustee regardless of 
whether he or she has the capability of doing a proper job. Pension 
reform is calling for fit and proper requirements. The advent of fit and 
proper requirements will hopefully bring with it better equipped 
trustees.  
 
11.2 Trustee training  
 
11.2.1 National Treasury has accepted that the key to good governance within 
funds is the role of trustees and as such trustees should have the 
necessary education, skills and experience to ensure that the decisions 
which they make are in the best interests of members and beneficiaries. 
The outcome of National Treasury’s deliberations on the governance 
within funds is that the best way to achieve this is by the application of fit 
and proper standards which govern the appointment of trustees and the 
introduction of mechanisms which achieve proper training.140  
 
11.2.2 In light of the determinations made by the Adjudicator and the relative 
simplicity which were faced by most Boards that were party to those 
determinations, an initial recommendation is that Boards need training 
which focuses of section 37C. To ensure that the training sessions are 
producing trustees who are capable and competent trustees should be 
compelled to write examinations before they are appointed to Boards. 
Such training and subsequent examinations will ensure a more 
knowledgeable Board which is capable of making a simple death benefit 
distribution without exposing the fund and its members and ultimately 
themselves to risk. This recommendation is in keeping with Government 
policy which is that it may make it a statutory requirement for trustees to 
be fit and proper with certain minimum qualifications, which must be 
                                                          
139 See J Mort & L Butler Beatty A Comparative Survey of Pension Law Issues 2nd edition (2011) at 
15. 
140 Supra at footnote 1. 
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achieved within a fixed period from the date of their appointment.141 
 
11.2.3 Even the Adjudicator has recommended that trustees need to be trained 
and that more money should be spent on such training given that a 
Board is responsible for the its members. The Adjudicator has also taken 
the view that the current method of training which is sold as an add on to 
administration or consulting services is not acceptable. The rationale 
being that different funds have different challenges and those challenges 
cannot be comprehensively met in a general training session. The 
Adjudicator has accepted that tailored training will be expensive but 
clearly states that “it is better in the long term to do things right than to be 
seen to do things right.”142 
 
                                                          
141 Supra at footnote 1. 
142 Adjudicator’s address to the Institute of Retirement Funds Annual Conference 2006, Durban 
International Convention Centre, 22 August 2006. 
11.3 Proposed standard operating procedure for distribution of death benefits 
 
11.3.1 A further recommendation is that Boards can mitigate their risk by adopting 
protocols or standard operating procedures (hereinafter referred to as SOP) 
which serve as guidance, in fact the adoption of such a document is 
contemplated by section 7 of the Act which requires a Board to implement 
proper control systems.  
 
11.3.2 This proposed standard operating procedure is aimed at assisting a Board in 
the exercise of its section 37C obligations. The SOP is not a document 
which must be adhered to by the Board but is rather intended to be a 
recommendation of the type of protocols which Boards should implement in 
order to mitigate the potential risks which attach to section 37C. Such 
protocols would also ensure uniformity when considering distributions and 
would be a tool which could be employed by newly appointed trustees to 
gain an understanding of what is required of them. 
 
11.3.3 This recommended SOP can be manipulated by a Board to form a protocol 
which suites the requirements of a specific fund and to cater for more 
complex distributions. The idea behind such a recommendation is that it 
codifies the Boards duties into a practical document while decreasing the 
Board’s exposure to risk. 
 
11.3.4 The obligations of the Board and the impact of its fiduciary duties are 
discussed more fully in the preceding chapters. 
 
11.3.5 The proposed SOP is the following: 
 
11.4 PHASE 1 – Does section 37C apply? 
 
11.4.1 What is the date of death of the deceased fund member?143 
 
11.4.2 Do the rules of the fund provide only for a spouse or children’s pension as a 
death benefit? If yes, section 37C does not apply. The Board is constrained 
by the rules of the fund and therefore need not consider this recommended 
protocol any further or adopt such a protocol as the fund does not provide for 
lump sum benefits as contemplated by section 37C. 
 
11.4.3 In the event that the rules provide for a lump sum death benefit, section 37C 
will apply.  A standard operating procedure, such as this one, should be 
adopted by the Board as it is intended to guide the Board in discharging its 
duties in terms of section 37C. 
 
  
                                                          
143 Recording such a date will assist in tracking the 12 month period. 
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11.5 PHASE 2 - Deductions 
 
11.5.1 Are there any deductions due in terms of section 37D of the Act? These are 
limited to deductions relating to: 
 
• Tax; 
• Loan or guarantees granted in terms of section 19(5) of the Act; 
• Compensation for damages (including legal costs) caused by the 
member to the employer by way of theft, dishonesty, fraud or 
misconduct; 
• Any amount assigned to the non-member spouse in terms of a decree of 
divorce granted under section 7(8)(a) of the Divorce Act; 
• Any amount payable by the member in terms of a maintenance order; or 
• Any amount which the Fund has paid or will pay by arrangement with the 
member or beneficiary in respect of a medical aid subscription or 
insurance premium. 
 
11.5.2 If yes, these deductions must be subtracted from the death benefit, the 
amount which remains is the value available for distribution.  Continue to 
Phase 3. 
 





11.6 PHASE 3 – IDENTIFY POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES 
 
11.6.1 Are there any nominees designated in writing by the deceased 
member? 
 
11.6.1.1 There are 3 requirements for a valid nomination, namely: 
 
• The nominee must not be a dependant of the deceased; 
• The nomination must be in writing; and 
• The nomination form must be addressed to the fund. 
 
11.6.1.2 If a nomination exists and the 3 criteria set out above are satisfied 
then the Board must record the nominees as potential beneficiaries. 
 
11.6.1.3 If a nomination exists but the criteria recorded above are not satisfied 
then the nomination form is not valid and the persons recorded 
thereon are not nominees as contemplated in the Act. Such persons 
are not to be considered in the distribution. 
 
11.6.2 Are there any dependants? 
 
11.6.2.1 The Board must collate as much information as possible with regard 
to identifying potential dependants. Information should include but is 
not limited to marriage certificates, birth certificates and the will of the 
deceased, etc. 
 
11.6.2.2 The Board should ensure that a comprehensive investigation is done 
in order to identify potential dependants. The investigation can be 
done by the administrator but the Board will be responsible for 
ultimately determining the dependants. If the investigation is done by 
the fund’s administrator, the Board should request frequent follow 
ups and progress reports. 
 
11.6.2.3 Once the Board has all the information in its possession the Board 
must then consider the different categories of dependants set out in 




11.7 “Paragraph (a) dependants”: Are there any persons in respect of whom the 
member was legally liable for maintenance? See paragraph 11.8 for guidance as to 
which person may qualify. 
 
11.7.1 Such a person must be dependent on the member for maintenance as a 
result of a legal obligation at common law or statute. This is satisfied if all  of 
the following criteria are met: 
 
11.7.2 Was the relationship such that the law imposed a duty of support?  
 
11.7.2.1 If yes, continue to paragraph 11.7.3 
11.7.2.2 If no, not a ‘paragraph (a) dependant”. Check if person is a 
“paragraph (b) or (c) dependant” (see 11.911.15  below). If no, 
person is not a dependant and therefore cannot benefit. 
 
11.7.3 Was the person who is claiming maintenance unable to support himself / 
herself? 
 
11.7.3.1 If yes, continue to paragraph11.7.4. 
11.7.3.2 If no, not a “paragraph (a) dependant”. Check if person is a 
“paragraph (b) or (c) dependant” (see paragraph 11.911.15 below). If 
no, person is not a dependant and therefore cannot benefit. 
 
11.7.4 Did the member have the resources to support the claimant? 
 
11.7.4.1 If yes, record dependant as potential beneficiary. 
11.7.4.2 If no, not a “paragraph (a) dependant”. Check if person is a 
“paragraph (b) or (c) dependant” (see paragraph 11.911.15 below). If 
no, person is not a dependant and therefore cannot benefit. 
 
GUIDANCE TO TRUSTEES ON PARAGRAPH (a) DEPENDANTS 
 
11.8 The following relationships may result in a paragraph (a) dependency: 
 




11.8.1.1 If there is a valid court order requiring the deceased fund member to 
maintain a child the requirements of paragraph (a) are satisfied and 
the child is a dependant. 
 
11.8.1.2 In the absence of a court order there is a common law duty on 
parents to maintain their children. If a major child requires support 
and the parents have the means to provide such support, then 
depending on the station in life of the parents, the parents may be 
liable to maintain a child beyond majority.  
 
11.8.1.3 If the criteria set out above are met, a minor or major child may be a 
dependant and is entitled to be considered by the Board when 
effecting the death benefit distribution. 
 
11.8.1.4 Trustees must ascertain that the child/children are in fact the children 
(including disinherited children) of the deceased.  Where the Board 
has doubts as to whether a child is in fact a child of the deceased 
member the Board needs to ascertain such fact before that child can 
be considered as a potential beneficiary. 
 
11.8.2 Children and Biological Parents  
 
11.8.2.1 A child has a reciprocal duty to maintain his/her parents if the parents 
are indigent and the child has the means to maintain the parents. 
The parent would need to demonstrate the need for support and not 
just the existence of a relationship. The indigent parent would need 
to demonstrate that there is an extreme need or want for the basic 
necessities. 
 
11.8.3 Biological Grandchildren and Grandparents  
 
11.8.3.1 There is a reciprocal duty of support between grandparents and 
grandchildren provided that the criteria set out above are met. A 
claimant would however be required to claim from the immediate 






11.8.4.1 There is a reciprocal duty of support between spouses regardless of 
whether the marriage was concluded in or out of community of 
property.  
 
11.8.4.2 Usually this duty terminates upon the death of one of the spouses or 
the dissolution of the marriage. However, parties to a divorce may 
agree upon some form of maintenance. The Board should peruse the 
divorce order and determine whether there is provision for 
maintenance, if so the spouse would be a paragraph (a) dependant.  
 
11.8.4.3 The Board must determine that the deceased and the spouse or 
former spouse were official partners. A “spouse” can prove the formal 
relationship with reference to the Marriage Act, the Civil Union Act, 
Black law and custom or Asiatic religion.  Boards should not ignore 
the existence of a “spouse” simply because the union occurred in 
terms of custom or religion.  Customary or religious unions can be 
evidenced.  
 
11.8.5 Adopted Children: see 11.14 below 
 
11.8.6 Illegitimate Children: see 11.14 below 
 
11.8.7 Posthumous Children: see 11.14 below 
 
11.9 “Paragraph b(i) dependants”: Are there any persons for whom the deceased fund 
member was not legally liable to maintain but who were, in the opinion of the Board, 
in fact dependant on the member for maintenance at the time of the member’s 
death? 
 
11.9.1 The Board must conduct an investigation and determine whether the 
deceased member was maintaining the person. This is a factual test. 
 
11.9.2 The Board has discretion when determining whether a person amounts to a 
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paragraph b(i) dependant or not.  Such a discretion should be reasonably 
exercised and take into consideration all relevant facts. 
 
11.9.3 Isolated payments by the deceased member to the person would not 
constitute maintenance. There needs to be regular proof of payments made 
by the deceased during and at the end of the deceased’s lifetime. The Board 
must during the investigation phase ascertain the regularity, if any, and 
nature and materiality of the payments. 
 
11.9.4 If the Board is satisfied that the person is a paragraph b(i) dependant then 
the person must be recorded as a potential beneficiary and considered at 
the time when an equitable distribution is determined.  
 
11.10 “Paragraph b(ii) dependants”: Is there any person whom the member was not 
legally liable to maintain but who was a spouse of the member as at date of death? 
 
11.10.1 “Spouse” is defined in the Act as a person who is the permanent life partner 
or spouse or civil union partner of a member in accordance with the 
Marriage Act, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, or the Civil 
Union Act or the tenets of any religion.  
 
11.10.2 If the Board has investigated the status of the relationship and is satisfied 
that the person is a “spouse” as defined then the person must be recorded 
as a potential beneficiary and be considered at the time when an equitable 
distribution is determined. 
 
GUIDANCE TO TRUSTEES ON “SPOUSES” 
 
11.11 African Customary Spouses 
 
11.11.1 The Board must establish that a customary marriage was celebrated and 
that the marriage continued to exist at the time of the deceased’s death. 
 
11.11.2 The Board must have full understanding of what is required in terms of the 
law under which the union was celebrated or dissolved eg. Zulu Law or 
Swazi Law in order to determine that the definition of spouse is satisfied 
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often such a determination will require the assistance of an expert in that 
particular cultural law. 
 
11.12 Tenets of any Religion 
 
11.12.1 The Board must investigate whether the requirements of specific religion 
have been complied with. The Board must satisfy itself that the requirements 
for a marriage or dissolution of a marriage have been met in accordance 
with the specific religion. Once again the Board can to the extent necessary 
call for expert evidence to assist in determining whether the marriage 




11.13.1 In appropriate situations and provided it has exercised its judgment, the 
Board may regard a co-habitee as not being a “paragraph b(ii) dependant”.  
 
11.13.2 The Constitutional Court144 has ruled that the different treatment of formally 
married spouses on one hand and co-habitees in a permanent life 
partnership on the other is not unconstitutional in so far as maintenance 
claims against a deceased estate goes.  
 
11.13.3 The Board could in appropriate cases decide that such a person amounts to 
a paragraph b(i) dependant instead.  
 
11.14 “Paragraph b(iii) dependants”: Are there any person whom the member was not 
legally liable to maintain but who is a child of the member, including a posthumous 
child, an adopted child and a child born out of wedlock? 
 
11.14.1 This section would include major children of the deceased who were not 
dependant on the deceased for maintenance. Prior to the inclusion of this 
aspect of the definition of dependant, financially independent major children 
were not entitled to be considered as dependants.  
 
                                                          




11.14.2 The Board should investigate and identify any children who satisfy this 
category and must record them as potential beneficiaries.  
 
11.15 “Paragraph (c) dependants”: Are there any persons whom the member would 
have become legally liable to maintain, had the member not died? 
 
11.15.1 Any person who is not a paragraph (a) or (b) dependant as at the date of the 
death of the member, but who in the view of the Board, either prior to the 
final distribution date or at a subsequent future date, would have become 
legally dependant on the pension fund member for maintenance, had he or 
she survived, qualifies as a paragraph (c) dependant. 
 
11.15.2 Examples of person who may satisfy this section are parents who were not 
legally dependant on their child for maintenance at the time of the child’s 
death, engaged couples and parties intending to marry, etc. 
 
11.16 Once all the potential beneficiaries have been identified in terms of Phase 3 




11.17 PHASE 4 - PAYMENT TO DECEASED ESTATE 
 
11.17.1 Has the Board, after 12 months and after conducting a 
reasonable investigation been unable to identify any 
dependants or nominees? 
 
11.17.1.1 If yes: 
 
11.17.1.2 The Board must determine whether there has 
been a deceased estate lodged with the Master 
of the High Court. If there is an estate the death 
benefit must be paid into the estate. 
 
11.17.1.3 If there is no estate the death benefit must be 
paid into the Guardians Fund. 
 
11.17.1.4 Given that payment falls due after the twelfth 
month, the Board should begin to make 
inquiries well before that time regarding the 
existence of a deceased estate. 
 
11.17.1.5 If no, go to 11.17.2 
 
11.17.2 Has the Board, after 12 months and after a reasonable 
investigation process, only identified nominees as 
potential beneficiaries, that is, no dependants have 
been identified? 
 
11.17.2.1 If yes: 
 
11.17.2.2 The Board must ascertain whether the estate of 
the deceased is in deficit. If the estate is in 
deficit then the Fund must pay the deficit into 
the estate and the balance must be distributed 




11.17.2.3 Given that payment falls due after the twelfth 
month, the Board should begin to make 
inquiries well before that time regarding the 
existence of a deficit in a deceased estate. 
 
11.17.2.4 The Board must look to the nomination form. 
The nominee(s) can only receive the portion of 
the benefit specified on the nomination form. 
The Board can reduce this portion by the 
portion required to make good any shortfall in 
the deceased’s estate.  
 
11.17.2.5 There is no law as to what the Board should do 
if the nomination form does not record how the 
benefit should be apportioned.  A Board which 
finds itself in such a situation could do a per 
capita distribution to the nominees or make 
some other distribution which could be 
reasonable and which could be successfully 
defended if challenged.  
 





11.18 PHASE 5  - DISTRIBUTION OF DEATH BENEFIT 
 
11.18.1 Payment must be made in proportions deemed 
equitable by the Board. The Act does not define 
“equitable” and provides no guidance to the Board as 
to what would amount to an equitable distribution. 
 
11.18.2 The Adjudicator has through determinations provided 
guidance on what factors could be considered by the 
Board. These factors are not exhaustive and the Board 
has discretion to reject a factor as being irrelevant or to 
include other relevant factors which it considers to be 
necessary in the circumstances of the particular 
distribution. 
 
11.18.3 The Board must consider all relevant factors in making 
an equitable distribution. 
 
11.18.4 It may be equitable in appropriate circumstances to 
give as much as 100% of the benefit to one potential 
beneficiary and nothing (0%) to another potential 
beneficiary. It is important that a Board remember that 
equitable does not translate into equal shares but 
rather amounts to a distribution which reflects the 
circumstances of a specific distribution. 
 
11.19 Wishes of the Deceased  
 
11.19.1 The Board should not fetter its discretion by blindly 
following a nomination form or the will of the deceased.  
 
11.19.2 If the Board is considering the wishes of the deceased 
the Board must ensure that they have an accurate 
indication, that is, they are not relying on an outdated 




11.19.3 This is only one consideration which may be taken into 
account by the Board and is not a decisive factor. 
 
11.20 Financial Status or Future Earning Capacity of Each 
Beneficiary 
 
11.20.1 The Board should obtain all relevant financial 
information from each potential beneficiary and verify 
such information. The Board needs to consider the 
current financial status of each potential beneficiary 
and their potential earning capacity.  
 
11.20.2 The Board should in assessing the financial status of a 
potential beneficiary consider insurance policy 
payments and benefits received from estate of the 
deceased. Consideration should also be given to 
inheritances received in terms of the last will and 
testament of the deceased. 
 
11.20.3 The financial status of a potential beneficiary should be 
reconsidered when the Board is about to effect the 
distribution as it is possible that such status may have 
changed to such an extent that the beneficiary could 
no longer be considered dependent on the deceased 
member. For instance if a potential beneficiary wins 
the National Lottery, such a person is unlikely to 
benefit. 
 
11.21 Extent of Dependency  
 
11.21.1 In assessing the extent of a potential beneficiary’s 
dependency on the deceased the Board would need to 
evaluate the extent to which the deceased was liable 
for the maintenance of the beneficiary and then 





11.21.2 The Board should determine the extent of dependency 
at the time of death of the member and then evaluate 
the current and future reasonable maintenance needs 
of a dependant.  
 
11.22 Age of Beneficiaries 
 
11.22.1 The age of a potential beneficiary will give the Board 
an indication of the length of time over which a 
potential beneficiary will require maintenance. 
 
11.22.2 A younger child is likely to require maintenance for a 
longer period than an older dependant or an older 
potential beneficiary may be given a greater amount as 
he or she has fewer income earning years than a 
younger potential beneficiary.  
 
11.22.3 The Board should evaluate the age of each dependant 
and then determine the period for which maintenance 
will be required. This will assist in effecting an 
equitable distribution. 
 
11.23 Relationship with Deceased 
 
11.23.1 The Board must examine social and emotional 
relationship which existed between the potential 
beneficiary and the deceased member.  
 
11.23.2 Bloody hand cannot benefit – the Board may decide 
that a potential beneficiary is precluded from 
benefitting if he or she (eg Najwa Pietersen) murdered 
the deceased or caused the deceased to be murdered. 
 




11.24.1 Often the benefit is insufficient to cover the 
maintenance needs of all potential beneficiaries. 
 
11.24.2 The Board must weigh all relevant factors and this may 
result in a potential beneficiary receiving less than his 
or her maintenance needs or being excluded from the 
distribution altogether. 
 
11.25 Social Policy  
 
11.25.1 According to a number of decided cases, section 37C 
is a social security measure. In theory it is designed to 
ensure that the dependants of a deceased do not 
become a burden on the state.  
 
11.25.2 The Board should try, where possible, to effect a 






11.26 PHASE 6 – DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE MODE OF 
PAYMENT 
 
11.26.1 Once the Board has determined the equitable 
distribution of the death benefit, the Board must 
determine the appropriate mode(s) of paying the 
amount payable to each beneficiary. 
 
11.26.2 Is the beneficiary a minor or a major? 
 
11.26.2.1 If a minor go to paragraph 11.27. 
11.26.2.2 If a major go to paragraph 11.32. 
 
11.27 Payment to a Minor 
 
11.27.1 The Board has the discretion to determine the mode of 
payment having regard to the best interests of the 
minor. The Board may after consideration choose one 
of the following methods of payment: 
 
11.27.1.1 payment may be made to a trust company 
provided that such company has been 
nominated by the member or a person 
recognised in law (such as a guardian) or 
appointed by a court as the person responsible 
for managing the affairs or meeting the daily 
care needs of the minor. If a trust is nominated 
this does not deprive the Board of discretion 
and the Board will need to consider whether 
placing the money in the specified trust would 
be better for the minor than for instance making 
payment to the minor’s guardian. 
 
11.27.1.2 the Board may pay the benefit to the person 
recognised in law (such as a guardian) or 
appointed by a court as the person responsible 
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for managing the affairs or meeting the daily 
care needs of the minor. 
 
11.27.1.3 The benefit may be paid to a beneficiary fund.  
Where payment is made to such a fund then if 
the beneficiary dies and assets remain in such 
fund, the assets must be paid to the 
beneficiary’s deceased estate or if no such 
estate exists to the Guardians Fund.  
 
11.27.1.4 The Board has the option of paying the benefit 
on an instalment basis. 
 
11.27.2 Once the Board has investigated the available options 
in light of specific beneficiary circumstances the Board 
may then effect payment in accordance with the 
determined mode. 
 
GUIDANCE TO BOARD RE: PAYMENT TO MINORS 
 
11.28 The Board cannot randomly opt for one of the options. The 
Board needs to investigate and evaluate what the best method 
of payment would be in light of the prevailing circumstances. 
 
11.29 The Board would need to be able to provide reasons as to 
why a specific mode of payment was jettisoned in favour of 
another.  
 
11.30 The Board must consider all potential persons recognised by 
law to whom payment can be made on behalf of the minor. 
For instance section 32 of the Children’s Act, No. 38 of 2005, 
provides that a  person who has no parental responsibilities 
and rights in respect of a child but who voluntarily cares for the 
child either indefinitely, temporarily or partially, including a 
care-giver who otherwise has no parental responsibilities and 
rights in respect of a child, must, whilst the child is in that 
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person’s care:  
 
• safeguard the child’s health, well-being and 
development; and 
• protect the child from maltreatment, abuse, neglect 
 
“Care giver” for this purpose means any person other than a 
parent or guardian, who factually cares for a child and 
includes 
 
(a) a foster parent; 
(b) a person who cares for a child with the implied or express 
consent of a parent or guardian of the child; 
(c) a person who cares for a child whilst the child is in 
temporary safe care; 
(d) the person at the head of a child and youth care centre 
where a child has been placed; 
(e) the person at the head of a shelter; 
(f) a child and youth care worker who cares for a child who is 
without appropriate family care in the community; and 
(g) the child at the head of a child-headed household 
 
11.31 The Board can make payment to a minor in more than one 
payment and in amounts which the Board considers 
appropriate and is in the best interests of the minor.  If the 
Board elects to make such payments then interest at a 
reasonable rate (fund return must be considered when 
determining a reasonable rate) must be added to the balance.  
Once the minor attains his/her majority or dies the balance 
owing must be paid into the minor or his or her estate 
depending on whether the event which occurs first is the 
attaining of majority or the death of the minor. 
 
11.32 Payment to a Major 
 
11.32.1 The Board has the discretion to choose one of the 
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following methods of payment: 
 
11.32.1.1 Payment to a major beneficiary; 
 
11.32.1.2 Payment may be made to a trust company 
provided that such company has been 
nominated by the member or the major or a 
person recognised in law or appointed by a 
court (such as a curator) as the person 
responsible for managing the affairs or meeting 
the daily care needs of the major; 
 
11.32.1.3 Payment may be made to a person recognised 
in law or appointed by a court as the person 
responsible for managing the affairs or meeting 
the daily care needs of the major; 
 
11.32.1.4 Payment to a beneficiary fund; or 
 
11.32.1.5 Payment on an instalment basis provided the 
major beneficiary consents to this in writing. 
 
11.32.2 Once the Board has investigated the available options 
in light of specific beneficiary circumstances the Board 
may then effect payment in accordance with the 
determined mode. 
 
GUIDANCE TO BOARD RE: PAYMENT TO MAJORS 
 
11.33 The Board cannot randomly opt for one of the options. The 
Board needs to investigate and evaluate what the best method 
of payment would be in light of the prevailing circumstances. 
 
11.34 The Board would need to be able to provide reasons as to 





11.35 The default position is payment to the major beneficiary unless 
the Board has very good reason for rejecting this mode of 
payment.  
 
11.36 If the major consents, in writing, the benefit payable to him/her 
can be paid in more than one payment.  If such a situation 
exists then an agreement must be entered into between the 
fund and the major which records the amount of payments, 
intervals of payment, interest to be added and any other 
appropriate and relevant terms and conditions.  The 
agreement must be capable of being cancelled by either party 
on notice of not more than 90 days and on such cancellation 










12.1 Status of hypotheses 
 
12.1.1 It is my submission that it is evident from the 
information which has been discussed above and more 
especially the determinations of the Adjudicator which 
were considered that there is without a doubt a lack of 
understanding on the part of individual Board members 
as to what is required of them when considering a 
death benefit distribution. Further the decisions of the 
Adjudicator are in essence very similar with the 
exception of the facts which are germane to a specific 
case. It appears that the Adjudicator simply cuts and 
pastes the basic principles and then addresses the 
differing facts. I further submit that such a practice is 
further evidence that the death benefit cases which are 
considered by the Adjudicator can be dealt with at 
Board level by applying the simple guidelines 
expressed by the Adjudicator and by Boards 
understanding their duty so that they can meet it. 
 
12.1.2 The situation in English law is that Board members 
have numerous opportunities to attend training and to 
write examinations. The Board members are also well 
versed in fiduciary duties. Given that the distribution of 
death benefits in England is very similar to the South 
African model and that the English legislation which 
governs the distribution of death benefit lump sums 
provides minimum guidance to Boards, it is my view 
that the low number of referrals to the Pensions 
Ombudsman is evidence that better training and 
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understanding will result in fewer referrals to the 
Adjudicator.  
 
12.1.3 My submission is that the determinations of the 
Adjudicator show that the practice within the industry, 
very often, differs from the correct legal interpretation 
of section 37C. Very often Boards exercise their 
discretion without recourse to the Act or the rules of 
the fund concerned. In such instances it is inevitable 
that the practice will differ from the legal instruments. 
The difference in practice is also fostered by lack of 
understanding and a sometimes over paternalistic 
approach which overshadows the duties which are 
imposed on the Board by the Act.  
 
12.1.4 It is reasonable to conclude that a Board which lacks 
understanding of the basic principles which it is 
required to adhere to, will be better equipped if it were 
given a guideline. The use of the Wednesbury 
Principles in England for instance must contribute to 
the low rate of death benefit referrals which are made 
to the Pensions Ombudsman. Very little evidence 
exists in the pension fund industry of Boards being 
equipped with the minimum factors which it needs to 
consider when exercising its discretion in accordance 
with section 37C. I submit that the use of such 
protocols and guidelines will result in fewer decisions 
of a Board being challenged and fewer successful 
challenges.  
 
12.1.5 It is evident from the discussion above that section 
37C provides many opportunities for a Board to make 
errors. It is also evident that the different steps 
associated with a death benefit distribution require a 
Board to have different considerations. The decisions 
of the Adjudicator have expressly recorded that there 
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are different considerations concerned, for instance, 
with the identification of potential beneficiaries as 
opposed to the considerations which need to be had 
when determining an equitable distribution of the 
benefit.  In light of this, I conclude that a Board which 
understands each step of the distribution will be better 
equipped to make a decision which is less susceptible 
to challenge and less likely to be overturned by the 
Adjudicator. 
 
12.1.6 I submit I have successfully shown that the actions of a 
Board, due to lack of knowledge, has a direct impact 
on the number of complaints made to the Adjudicator 
regarding the distribution of death benfits and that such 
a submission is evidenced by the statements of the 
Adjudicator. I have also provided Boards with 
recommendations aimed at obtaining an understanding 
of their role in the distribution of death benefits and 
with mechanisms which can be implemented by 
Boards which seek to draw a map through the 
minefield which is death benefit distribution. It is my 
view that by adopting the recommendations Boards will 
be equipped to consider simple distributions and will 
be aware that they may seek the services of an expert 
for assistance with complex death benefit distributions. 
 
12.2 Possible further study 
 
12.2.1 Notwithstanding that this dissertation expressly 
assumed that defective drafting of section 37C is not 
the cause of the number of complaints arising within 
the context of death benefit distributions, after 
completion of this dissertation it is my submission that 
an analysis of the Act and more especially section 37C 
would reveal further insights as to why Boards are not 
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able to always comply with their duties when 
distributing a death benefit. Accordingly, further study 
into the legislative framework and whether legislative 
intervention is needed may result in the hypotheses 
which I confirmed above being weakened but not 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
the Act    means the Pension Funds Act, No 24 of 1956; 
 
the Adjudicator  means the Pension Funds Adjudicator or 
Deputy Pension Funds Adjudicator and any 
acting Pensions Fund Adjudicator appointed in 
terms of section 30C of the Act; 
 
administrator  means a person approved by the Registrar in 
terms of section 13B(1) of the Act and 
appointed by a fund to provide it with 
administration services; 
 
beneficiary means a nominee or dependant of a deceased 
member who is entitled to be considered when 
a Board determines an equitable distribution of 
a death benefit; 
 
beneficiary fund means a fund referred to in paragraph (c) of the 
definition of a pension fund organisation as 
defined in the Act; 
 
the Board or a Board refers to the board of a fund contemplated in 
terms of section 7A of the Act; 
 
death benefit means, in relation to a fund, any amount 
payable upon the death of a member in terms 
of the rules of the fund; 
 
deceased   means a member who is deceased; 
 
dependant  means, in relation to a member, 
 
(a) a person in respect of whom the member is 
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legally liable for maintenance; 
(b) a person in respect of whom the member is 
nor legally liable for maintenance, if such 
person: 
 
(i) Was in the opinion of the board, 
upon the death of the member in 
fact dependant on the member for 
maintenance; 
(ii) Is the spouse of the member; 
(iii) Is a child of the member, including a 
posthumous child, an adopted child 
and a child born out of wedlock. 
 
(c) a person in respect of whom the member 
would have become legally liable for 
maintenance; had the member not died; 
 
English Boards the board of trustees mandated to manage the 
affairs of a pension fund registered in terms of 
the laws of the United Kingdom 
 
fund means a pension fund organisation as defined 
in the Act and ‘pension fund’ has the same 
meaning; 
 
FSB means the Financial Service Board provided for 
by the Financial Services Board Act;  
 
ILJ    means the Industrial Law Journal; 
 
LAWSA   means the Law of South Africa; 
 
National Treasury Department of National Treasury in the 




Major    a person who has attained 18 years of age; 
 
member means a person who satisfies the eligibility 
criteria of a fund and has been accepted for 
membership of the fund; 
 
minor a person who has not yet attained 18 years of 
age; 
 
PF Circular 130 circular issued by the Registrar which reflects 
his interpretation of good governance within 
pension funds and which has no legal status; 
 
Registrar means the Registrar or Deputy Registrar of 
Pension Funds; 
 
Rules means the registered rules of a fund as 
recorded at the Office of the Registrar; 
 
SA Merc LJ means the South African Mercantile Law 
Journal; 
 
section 37C    means section 37C of the Act; 
 
SOP    means a standard operating procedure; and 
 


















Coopers and Lybrand Corporate Governance 
 
Coopers and Lybrand Corporate Governance; enhancing 
accountability of pension and provident funds: a guide to 
trustees and managers (Coopers and Lybrand 1994) 
 
Currie and De Waal Constitution  
 





Downie Retirement Fund Management  
 
Downie J and Ryneveld B The essential of retirement fund 




Geral Pension Law  
 




 Hoexter Administrative Law  
 




Hunter Commentary on the Pension Funds Act 
 
Hunter R et al The Pension Funds Act: A commentary on the 
Act, regulations, selected notices, directives and circulars 




Marx and Hanekom Manual Retirement Fund 
 
Marx GL and Hanekom K The Manual on South African 
Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits 2009 ed 
(Lexis nexis Durban 2009) 
 
Mort and Beatty Comparative Survey 
 
Mort J and Beatty L A Comparative Survey of Pension Law 




Ramjohn Trust Law 
 





Self Trustee Handbook 
 









Wright Fiduciary Duties 
 
Wright SD The fiduciary duties of retirement fund trustees; a 
guide to the principles of trusts and fiduciary duties as they 





Anon (stands for anonymous) 2009 LAWSA 280 
 
Anon “Disposition of pension benefits on death of member” 
2009 (20(1)) LAWSA 280 - 281 
 
Barrow & Gubula 2008 Without Prejudice 44 
 
Barrow O & Gubula N “Pension fund trustees: are their 
obligations too onerous?” 2008(8) Without Prejudice 44-45 
 
Grefen 2011 Pensions World 12 
 
Grefen J “A practical guide to your trustees’ duties” 2011 
Pensions World 12-14 
 
Hayes 2009 De Rebus 
 
Hayes D “Further dependants in terms of paragraph c of the 
PFA” 2009 (8) De Rebus  
 




Lehmann K “Death and dependency: the meaning of 
'dependent' under section 37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 
1956: notes” (2009) 126 SALJ 650-666 
 
Mackenzie 2009 De Rebus 
 
Mackenzie K “Duties of pension fund trustees” (2009) 7 De 
Rebus 
 
Manamela 2005 SA Merc LJ 276 
 
Manamela T “Chasing away the ghost in death benefits: A 
closer look at section 37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 
1956” (2005) 17 SA Merc LJ 276-294 
 
Mhango 2008 ILJ 2439 
 
Mhango MO “The duty to investigate factual dependants: a 
comment on De Beers & Others v Hosaf Fibre Provident 
Fund” (2008) 29 ILJ 2439-2446 
 
Mhango 2008 SA Merc LJ 126 
 
Mhango MO “An examination of the accurate application of 
the dependency test under the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956: 
case comments” (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 126-135 
 
Middleton 2007 Pensions World 6 
Middleton M “Fidentia found the gap” (2007) 10 Pensions 
World 6 
 
Nevondwe 2009 De Rebus 
 
Nevondwe L “Recent amendments to the PFA divorce and 
death benefits in the Financial Services General Laws 
125 
 
Amendments Act” 2009 (3) De Rebus 
 
Sigwadi 2008 SA Merc LJ 331 
 
Sigwadi M “The personal liability of pension fund trustees for 
breach of fiduciary duties” (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 331-346 
 
Van Wyk 2008 Pensions World 8 
 
Van Wyk L “Death benefits and the test of dependency – the 
Thene case” (2008) 11 Pensions World 8-10 
 
Discussion Papers and FSB Circulars  
 
National Treasury: A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better 
Policy Document 23 February 2011  
 
National Treasury: Retirement Fund Reform A Discussion Paper 
December 2004 
 
National Treasury: Social Security and Retirement Reform Second 
Discussion Paper February 2007 
 
Department of Social Development: Reform of Retirement Provisions 
2007 
 
PF Circular 130:“Good governance of retirement Funds”, Financial 








Jithoo T “Placing death benefits in trust and the change to the age of 
majority” (unpublished paper delivered at the Pension Lawyers 
Association seminar 29 August 2009) 
 
MacKenzie “Death benefits” 
 
MacKenzie K “Till death benefits do us part...”, (unpublished paper 





Ngalwana V “Working together for reform” (unpublished paper 
delivered at the Institute of Retirement Funds, Annual Conference 22 
August 2006 Durban Convention Centre) 
 
Ngalwana “Amendment Act” 
 
Ngalwana V “Critical issues facing OPFA with reference to the 
provisions of the Pension Fund Amendment Act” (unpublished paper 






Ngalwana V “Good governance guidelines for retirement funds” 





[last visited 30 September 2011] 
 




http://www.fsb.co.za [last visited on 30 September 2011] 
 
http://www.gov.za [last visited on 30 September 2011] 
 
http://www.icas.org.uk [last visited 29 February 2012] 
 
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. [last visited 30 September 
2011]] 
 
http://www.pensions-ombudsman.org.uk [last visited 29 February 
2012]] 
 
http://www.pfa.org.za [last visited 29 February 2012]] 
 
http://www.poa.org.za [last visited 30 September 2011]] 
 











Art Medical Equipment v Mes, Witwatersrand Local Division Case 




Botha v Cape Gate Management Provident Fund and Others South 
Gauteng High Court Case No. 08/6618 (unreported) 
 
Bouwer v Central Retirement Annuity Fund (PFA/GA/2789/2005/RM) 
 
Brummelkamp v Babcock Africa (1997) Pension Fund and Another 
(2001) 4 BPLR 1811 (PFA) 
 




Cape Gate Management Provident Fund v Botha and Others South 
Gauteng High Court Case No. 2010/5463 (unreported) 
 
Carvalho v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund & Others 
(PFA/WE/7998/06/CN) 
 
Chitja v Alexander Forbes Financial Services 
(PFA/GA/8633/2006/SM) 
 
Coetzee v Central Retirement Annuity Fund 
(PFA/GA/17436/2007/LTN) 
 






Dhlamini v Smith and Another [2003] 7 BPLR 4894 (PFA) 
 
Ditshabe v Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund & Another (2) [2001] 
10 BPLR 2579 (PFA) 
 
Dobie NO v National Technikon Retirement Pension Fund (1999) 9 
BPLR 29 (PFA) 
 
Dollman v Irvin and Johnson Retirement Fund (2008) JOL 22727 
 




Edge v Pensions Ombudsman (CA) (1999) OPLR 179 
 
 
Ellis NO v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund (2001) 5 BPLR 2021 
(PFA) 
 




Govender v Santam Insurance Retirement Fund and Another 
(PFA/GA/6041/05/LCM) 
 












Jacobs NO v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and Another (2001) 1 
BPLR 1488 (PFA) 
 
Jacobz v Altron Group Pension Fund and Others (2003) 8 BPLR 5071 
(PFA) 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Limited 1988 
(3) SA 132 (A) 
 
Johnathan v Illovo Sugar Pension Fund (PFA/WE/12230/2007/PM) 
 





Kaplan & Another NNO v Professional and Executive Retirement 
Fund and Others; Kaplan& Another NNO v VIP Retirement Annuity 
Fund and Others (2001) 10 BPLR 2541 (W) 
 
Khulu v Life care Group and Others (PFA/GA/8012/2006/SM) 
 




Lebepe v Premier Foods Provident Fund and Others [2007] 3 BPLR 
325 (PFA) 
 









Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund (2002) 
8 BPLR 70 (W) 
 
Mashego v Satu National Provident Fund (PFA/GA/3542/05/VIA) 
 
Matlakane v Royal Paraffin Provident Fund (2003) 6 BPLR 4785 
(PFA) 
 
Mes v Art Medical Equipment (PFA/GA/1198/00/LS) 
 
Mithiyane v Fedsure Life Assurance Limited and Others (2002) 5 
BPLR 3460 (PFA) 
 
Mokoena v Metal Industries Provident Fund 2003 (3) BPLR 4481 
 
Mofokeng v Millenium Entertainment Group Provident Fund 
(PFA/GA/11337/2006/CMS) 
 
Moir v Reef Group Pension Plan and Others [2000] 6 BPLR 629 
(PFA) 
 
Moralo v Holcim SA Provident Fund [2007] JOL 20415 (PFA) 
 
Morgan v SA Druggist Provident Fund 2001 (4) BPLR 1886 (PFA) 
 
Mostert NO v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (SA) Ltd (2001) 8 
BPLR 2307 (SCA) 
 




















Reuters v Telkom Retirement Fund 2003 (3) BPLR 4501 (PFA) 
 
Rikhoto v East Rand Administration Board 1983 (4)SA 278 (W) 
 




Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
(2004) 1 BPLR 5333 (CC) 
 
Seymour-Smith v Maxam Dantex South Africa (Pty) Limited and 
Others 2008 JDR 0362 (W) 
 
Schleicher and Another v SA Retirement Annuity Fund and Others 
2002 (7) BPLR 3677 (PFA) 
 
Shuping v Senwes Pension Fund (PFA/FS/4440/05/SG) 
 









Tlou v Amplats Mines Retirement Fund and Old Mutual Life 




Waks v Jacobs 1990 (1) SA 913 (T) 
 
Williams v FFE Minerals South Africa Pension Fund and Another 
[2001] 2BPLR 1678 (PFA) 
 
Wilson v The Law Debenture Trust Corporation (1995) OPLR 103 
 
 




Zikhali and Another v Metal Industries Provident Fund (1) (2001) 12 
BPLR 2895 (PFA) 
 
Zulu v Illovo Sugar provident Fund (2002) 2 BPLR 3129 (PFA) 
 
Zwane v Wiseman and Others (2005) 1 BPLR 92 (PFA) 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 
 
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 
 
The Administration of Deceased Estates Act 57 of 1988 
 




The Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 
 
The Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
 
The Promotion of Administration of Justice Act 3 of 2001 
 
 
